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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
It is an extensively accepted truth that parties are the main actors in modern 
liberal democracies1. However, the last twenty years have seen a number of significant 
independent actors emerge in more than a few political systems worldwide. In an 
attempt to investigate the rise of non-party actors we analyse the case of independent 
competitors in Central and Eastern Europe elections. More precisely, this paper aims 
to scrutinize the issue of independent candidatures addressed in the specific setting of 
post-communist Romanian local politics. We intend to explore a topic which has been 
greatly ignored by scholars, despite its obvious contribution to the modernization of 
the electoral pace of Eastern European countries. Independents represent more than 
occasional appearances at various electoral cycles, they offer a measure of the state 
of the party system at large. This is specifically why an attempt at addressing the 
presence of independent politicians in the particular situation of the third wave of 
democratization might give us a better impression of the maturity of the electoral 
system and also of the success of the democratic changes.
Two decades after the breakdown of communist regimes, parties and party 
systems throughout Eastern European polities still undergo extreme internal 
transformations. During the period of post-communist transition, many of these 
traditionally dominant parties have seen their vote shares drop under the weight 
of accusation of unrepresentativeness and endemic corruption2. Public rejection of 
party politics created an opening in the electoral market for independent political 
entrepreneurs, whose points of access in local politics are not dependent on party 
affiliation, but rather on their ability to present themselves as viable alternatives to 
the traditional parties by emphasizing local issues and their distinction from party 
elites. 
Independent politicians represent a particular manifestation of post-communist 
politics which deserves further investigation, especially due to their recurrence in 
the local elections. Commonly, the local office is the first and decisive stepping-stone 
to higher elected positions of public trust, with local elections profoundly altering 
the course of national politics; such was the case of the office of the general mayor 
of Bucharest which served as departing point for various positions in the central 
1 Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries, Yale University Press, New Heaven, 2000, p. 25.
2 Tom GALLAGHER, The Balkans in the New Millennium – in the Shadow of War and Peace, 
Routledge, London, pp. 186-187.
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administration1. We believe this to be an additional argument for the importance of 
local level politics and for treating independent candidatures in this specific setting 
with extensive attention, together with the observations that voters tend to form their 
political preference at the local level and to maintain it for mainstream elections and 
also that local elections might be instrumented as barometers of national political 
trends, because it helps politicians at large determine what matters most to voters2. 
Despite the vivid importance of local elections in Romanian politics, the local 
voting literature appears limited, while mostly integrating the national outlook. 
Similarly, the discipline seems excessively preoccupied with presidential elections 
and leaves local politics largely untouched in the realm of party studies and electoral 
politics3. Compiling an orderly review of the literature led us to the identification of 
only a handful of studies that have attempted to question the elements of local elections 
and of even fewer that scrutinize the particular place occupied by independents. Still, 
these studies are rather distant from the Eastern European region and we can hardly 
say much about what motivates certain politicians to run as independents, or about 
the value of incumbency over first-time independents, or about the importance of 
financial support in winning votes, or whether personal qualifications of individual 
candidates can compensate for the lack of party backing. Another issue we observed 
during our attempt was represented by the insufficiency of studies which go beyond 
casual partisan and socioeconomic features of the voting process, or of analyses that 
follow independent leaders which manage to capture office not only during their 
electoral effort, but all throughout their mandate. Thirdly, limited considerations exist 
regarding the voting behaviour for local elections, keeping in mind the basic fact that 
this problematic has been recursively addressed especially in those studies in which 
national politics are scrutinized4. Most probably this has happened because of the 
inadequate amount of existing data and equally because of the preference of numerous 
authors for solo cross-sectional analysis. Therefore, one purpose of this study would 
be to address these matters preponderantly from an Eastern European perspective. 
Namely, this would mean to analyse what motivates certain political actors to run 
as independents, in what way these types of independent candidatures are different 
from partisan campaigning and to question how they manage to mobilize the needed 
support in this particular context. Our main question refers to what fuels independent 
candidatures in party-controlled political systems? We intend to accomplish this 
rather daunting task by analysing the recurrence of independent candidacies at local 
elections which have been organized in post-communist Romania between 1992 
and 2008. For that matter, we believe that post-communist Romania represents an 
illustrative application of independent politics particularly because its particular 
electoral setting is not directly conducive to independent candidacies. Nonetheless, 
despite this fact, independent entries have occurred with more or less success during 
1 IDEM, Theft of a Nation. Romania since Communism, Hurst, London, 2005, p. 170.
2 James D. KING, ”Comparing Local and Presidential Elections”, American Politics Research, 
vol. 9, no. 3, 1981, pp. 277-290.
3 Arthur H. MILLER, Martin P. WATTENBERG, Oksana MALANCHUK, ”Schematic 
Assessments of Presidential Candidates”, American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 2, 1986, 
pp. 521-540.
4 Craig GOODMAN, Gregg R. MURRAY, ”Do You See What I See? Perceptions of 
Party Differences and Voting Behavior”, American Politics Research, vol. 35, no. 6, 2007, 
pp. 905-931.
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the past two decades. Mayoral, local council and county council elections will be our 
main targets, with special attention reserved for those areas where most independent 
candidatures were articulated. Similarly, we will not ignore the political trajectories 
of independents following their election, especially as we believe it to be decisive for 
depicting the political performance of independent actors.
Segments of the population and demands usually excluded from consideration by 
highly centralized and self-absorbed national parties identified an alternative means to 
voice their grievances thanks to independent politicians. With questions about roads, 
schools and trash pickup dominating local elections, local notabilities found it possible 
to have a say in an area usually monopolized by political parties. This particular 
setting was intensely exploited by independents during the last two decades. And, 
despite constrains imposed against them by the party-dominated electoral system, 
these independent political actors managed to advance their candidatures against 
party competitors. Here, we need to identify what made this particular situation 
possible. Was it the personal appeal of independents, the electorate’s desire for viable 
alternatives to party politics or it was more of an exceptional setting which favoured 
independent standings? Essentially, the phenomenon of independent candidatures 
challenges the commonly accepted concepts in party research and particularly, raises 
questions about the organizational advantages of parties and doubts the dominant 
role of party structures as representation mediums. The widely spread belief that 
parties as organizational vehicles represent the best means for individual actors to 
obtain electoral gains has increasingly become the subject of critique since both the 
decline of the party identification model and the rise of anti-party sentiment left 
established parties increasingly unpopular among electorates1. This is not to say that 
partisan politics is becoming redundant in the proximity of independence; instead, 
we plan to investigate what might encourage independents to challenge a political 
setting otherwise uniformly subject to partisan supremacy.
Research Approach and Strategy
This paper sets out to explore and understand the peculiarities of independent 
candidatures at local level, in an Eastern European post-communist setting. It focuses 
on the development of this particular type of politicians in societies that are moving 
away from the communist derail, and soughs to analyse independents’ specific 
place in the post-communist establishment. Through the research, the project aims 
to highlight the dynamics of local independence by approaching its main actors, the 
politicians who ran as independents and, using this particular label, managed to 
get into office. The main objective, as well as providing an insight into the rationale 
behind the individuals which enter politics on their own, is to deliver an analysis of 
the local context where independents advance their candidatures and of the general 
legal framework so as to better discriminate between the advantages and drawbacks 
of this particular political habitat for independent politicians.
For better understanding why politicians chose the independent path to office we 
interviewed thirty independent politicians who participated in the last local electoral 
1 Diana OWEN, Jack DENNIS, ”Anti-partyism in the USA and Support for Ross Perot”, 
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 29, no. 3, 1996, pp. 383-401.
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moment organized in Romania, namely in the June 2008 elections. We believe such 
an investigation might offer fundamental insight regarding independents’ motivation 
to get involved in local politics without any sort of party support and can provide us 
with a more general impression on the dimension of political independence in post-
communist Romania. Using political autobiography as main research method, a total 
of thirty interviews were conducted with independent politicians elected for the office 
of mayor, selected randomly from within the public database provided by the Electoral 
Authority. These interviews form the primary empirical data of the study. They took 
place from April 2010 to May 2010. Particularly, the interviews were open-ended, 
as this allowed for the interviewers to express their ideas, thoughts, and memories 
freely, using their own words. The interviews were supplemented by many other 
informal discussions with those involved in local politics as independents, together 
with consistent monitoring of existing official sources on independent candidatures. 
The interview material was thematically approached, the results being analysed in 
the empirical part of our paper. Our analysis employed as dependent variable the 
total number of votes received by each candidate and generally his or hers political 
reach, whereas the independent ones consisted of candidate’s personal characteristics, 
political resources and endorsements as well as the political following. Ultimately, 
the control variables were represented by the number of candidates who run in each 
election together with numbers that stand for the voter turnout. Electoral campaign 
served as unit of analysis, data being collected for each election year on the total votes 
received by independents and translated to the size of their political followership 
which we measured by the comparing independents’ scores to the total numbers. 
Also we employed a variety of personal indicators obtained from the interviews 
conducted with the candidates, their official profiling on their promotional materials 
and in the local media. The data are drawn from observing five successive mayor, 
local council and county council elections between 1992 and 2008. During this period 
numerous independent candidates participated in local campaigning, with a total of 
1229 mayor nominations won, and almost 6000 councillors’ mandates accorded to 
independents. A breakdown of these campaigns shows that, despite the decrease of 
the general scores obtained by independents, independent politicians managed to 
get re-elected on various occasions. We also met some exceptional situations where 
independents established a monopoly in those respective localities. In the next parts 
of our research we will attempt to advance various explanatory interpretations for 
this precise situation. 
Our analysis will focus on three different electoral levels with independence 
occurrences – elections for the mayor’s office and for the local and county councils. 
Drawing from the existing literature a number of key questions were identified which 
guided the structure of the interviews and the analysis that followed. Together with 
the qualitative data we plan to obtain from the interviews, in order to demonstrate the 
empirical relevance of independents in Romanian local politics we refer to the details 
on vote, seat and candidate share obtained by independents in local elections held 
between 1992 and 2008. Observing the often significant presence of independents, 
with several cases when they won over fifty percent of the vote, we can rightfully 
asses the validity of our selection.
For the purpose of the present examination we start from the basic observation 
that party supremacy is under serious revision especially at the local level, where 
ordinary citizens make up their electoral decision based on daily issues, rather than 
on political platforms. Consequently, independents see their chance of success being 
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helped by both this relative decline of electoral parties, as well by the increased 
electoral volatility in modern party democracies1. It remains to verify to which extent 
these presumptions apply as well to the polity under scrutiny here.
As architects of electoral system, the dominant political parties made their 
best to assure their prevalence in the party system. Due to the specific exigencies 
of the electoral competition the monopoly of political parties is preserved, to 
the disadvantage of independent interventions2. Nonetheless, despite the all-
encompassing partisan framework in nowadays politics, independents manage to 
voice their interests and some succeed to win sympathies of the electorate. In order 
to take our investigation further, several questions are needed: How do independents 
manage to convince the voters of their trustworthiness? And what motivates these 
candidates to choose the independent path to getting in office in the first place? What 
makes independent candidates prone to survive electoral quarrels, even as they might 
seem disadvantaged by their initial lacking of a coherent party structure? Is there 
a direct relationship between non-partisanship and the negative views concerning 
the parties’ role in democratic politics? Is winning elections in the particular case of 
independents more about contextual factors, than actually about attributes inherent 
to the political system? Similarly, should we expect younger generations to feel more 
close to independents? One puzzling question which first needs answering would be 
why do independents basically regard the parties as irrelevant in the search for public 
office? Can it be because they fail to procure a party nomination or because their 
political career discriminates fundamentally against partisan affiliation? Certainly 
independent identifications are motivated by distinct features, but we believe that a 
focal point exists. Starting from these convergent traits of independent candidatures 
we intend to identify also how do independents relate to party counter candidates 
and what sort of rhetoric they employ against them. Another question should also 
be answered, namely why does the electorate show appetite for a virtually unknown 
candidate who can hardly compete with the organizational advantages of candidates 
supported by political parties? Subsequently, some authors argue that independent 
candidacies seem to be mainly fuelled by party detachment, with voters expressing 
their grievances mainly against specific parties and not necessarily against the concept 
of parties per se3. Might this mean that independents have limited electoral resonance 
in today’s politics of post-communist polities? Likewise, what could best explain 
the variation in the electoral reach of independent candidates? Are independent 
candidates habitually more circumstance-dependent than party actors? We will 
attempt to provide these questions with an answer starting from the observation that, 
unquestionably, the ability of independents to win votes is not carved in stone, facing 
significant variations not only from one scrutiny to another in different electoral 
districts, but also within the same constituency. This is especially true as individual 
politicians don’t enjoy a party brand, and manage to obtain at best low scores of 
the so-called ”captive electorate”4. But despite this obvious drawback of political 
1 Michael MARSH, ”Candidates or Parties? Objects of Electoral Choice”, Party Politics, 
vol. 13, no. 4, 2007, pp. 500-527.
2 Liam WEEKS, ”Independents: a case-study”, in Kris DESCHOUWER (ed.), New Parties 
in Government: in Power for the First Time, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 143-144.
3 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independent Candidates 
Worldwide”, Journal of Politics, vol. 70, no. 3, 2008, pp. 648–662.
4 Ibidem.
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independence, there are vivid examples of constituencies lost by political parties 
in favour of independent contenders. Equally, the unpredictability encompassed in 
political independence makes our scrutiny as necessary as it can serve as a test of the 
maturity of our political system. 
Without the label and without any financial backing of political parties 
independents face numerous obstacles winning political office. The ability of 
independent candidates to gather votes varies from constituency to constituency and 
even within the ranks of the same constituency1. Therefore, one problem would be 
identifying what might explain this disparity in the electoral potency of independent 
candidates. A first step in an attempt to address this problematic would be to identify 
the relevant texts which try to scrutinize the issue of independent candidatures.
Studying independent candidatures turns us to reviewing a literature dominated 
by two-dimensional constructions afar from our region of interest. Most identified 
approaches draw their conclusions from a biased understanding of independent elites, 
whose specific characteristics are identified by opposing them to political parties. Or, 
it is quite difficult to comprehend the true nature of political independence by simply 
comparing it to its partisan counterpart and disregarding its intrinsic incentives. For 
that reason, our present attempt will depart from this party-centred understanding of 
independency so that to reach some appreciations on political independence from a 
more autonomous outlook. 
Our attempt at approaching the issue of independent candidatures from a 
comparative perspective led us to identifying the existing case studies on Australian 
independents by Elim Papadakis and Clive Bean2, analyses of the British acceptance 
of independent candidatures, those focused on Canadian politics such as that 
compiled by Éric Bélanger3, the Japanese account of Robin Le Blanc4, a Norwegian 
case5, or some limited examples investigating the Russian situation – here we chiefly 
refer to the leading paper written by Robert Moser6. Many of our available literature 
targeted peculiarities of independent candidatures within the American presidential 
competition7 and in the context of minor and third parties8. There are important 
structural transformations going on in Eastern European politics particularly 
1 Susan HERBST, Politics at the Margin: Historical Studies of Public Expression Outside the 
Mainstream, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, pp. 70-71.
2 Elim PAPADAKIS, Clive BEAN, ”Independents and Minor Parties: The Electoral 
System”, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 30, no.1, 1995, pp. 97-110.
3 Éric BÉLANGER, ”Antipartyism and Third-party Vote Choice: A Comparison of Canada, 
Britain, and Australia”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 37, no. 9, 2004, pp. 1054-1078.
4 Robin LE BLANC, ”Rebuilding the Electoral Connection: An Examination of the Origin 
and Potential of Anti-Party Electoral Movements in Japanese Local Politics”. Paper presented 
at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2004. http://
allacademic.com/meta/p60767_index.html (accessed on 22.02.2010).
5 Jacob AARS, Hans-Erik RINGKJØB, ”Party Politicisation Reversed? Non-partisan 
Alternatives in Norwegian Local Politics”, Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 2005, 
pp. 161-181.
6 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening 
Variable in Russian Politics”, Comparative Politics, vol. 31, no. 2, 1999, pp. 147-165.
7 Steven J. ROSENSTONE, Roy L. BEHR, Edward H. LAZARUS, Third Parties in America. 
Citizen Response to Major Party Failure, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996.
8 William SCHNEIDER, ”Antipartisanship in America”, in Vernon BOGDANOR (ed.), 
Parties and Democracy in Britain and America, Praeger, New York, 1984, pp. 103-144.
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affecting local political leadership, but we can hardly assess these manifestations by 
referring solely to the remote examples mentioned before. More than in other fields 
of political science, we believe that our investigation on the dynamics of independent 
candidatures in local politics should foremost take into consideration the immediate 
environment, while make usage of the existing literature as a departing theoretical 
framework. Reviewing the existing literature on political independence we stumbled 
upon several approaches. Some scholars view independence from the behavioural 
point of view, and address voters which ditch their partisan affiliation in order to 
either split their ticket, or to switch from one party to another partisan formation 
or independent candidate1. These attempts view independent candidatures highly 
dependent on the structuring of the electorate, and put great emphasis on the personal 
traits of independent leaders. Others focus on dispositional provisions influencing 
political independence, and develop a typology of self-defined independents and 
independent candidates2. Our present academic endeavour attempts to navigate 
the elements of independence starting from the advantages presented by the latter 
approach. We should also keep in mind that, subscribing to the common belief that 
political parties are indispensable to modern democracy, most scholars consider 
independents as redundant or even opposing democratic practice3. Some academics 
such as Robert Moser believe independent candidates are responsible for lowering 
voter turnout because they fail to present voters with viable alternative policies; at the 
same time, other authors consider that independents are prone to affect representation 
particularly for poor and less educated strata4. In one of their common works, Brain 
Schaffner, Matthew Streb, and Gerald C. Wright agree that non-partisanship might 
indeed depress turnout and take their argument forward in saying that independent 
candidates are to be blamed for holding back challengers from defeating incumbents5. 
Conversely, other scholars think that independents contribute to the electoral success 
of less preferred candidates and even that they increase the saliency of the electoral 
race. On a more categorical tone, independent politicians are also accused by the same 
academics to interfere with the administration’s stability to the point that they can 
induce deadlocks6. But, along with these less fortunate approaches, there is also the 
so-called ”half-full view”. Scholars which perceive in more bright colours the issue of 
independent candidates imply that they strengthen democracy by nurturing citizen’s 
interest in politics and by voicing critiques, acutely needed for the restructuring of 
the establishment7. Nevertheless, despite these unilateral approaches on the issue of 
1 Walter DeVRIES, V. Lance TARRANCE, The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in American 
Politics, Eerdmans, Michigan, 1972, pp. 67-72.
2 Paul R. ABRAMSON, John H. ALDRICH, Phil PAOLINO, David W. RHODE, ”Third-
Party and Independent Candidates in American Politics: Wallace, Anderson and Perot”, Political 
Science Quarterly, vol. 110, no. 3, 1995, pp. 349-367.
3 Ibidem.
4 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation...cit.”, pp. 147-165.
5 Brain F. SCHAFFNER, Matthew J. STREB, Gerald C. WRIGHT, ”Teams without Uniforms: 
The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections”, Political Research Quarterly, vol. 54, no. 1, 
2001, pp. 17-30.
6 Arthur LUPIA, ”Busy Voters, Agenda Control and the Power of Information”, American 
Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 2, 1992, pp. 390-403.
7 Shanto IYENGAR, Adam F. SIMON, ”New Perspectives and Evidence on Political 
Communication and Campaign Effects”, Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 51, no. 1, 2000, 
pp. 149-169.
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political independency, we consider that in order to approach this particular subject 
we need to assume a less biased viewpoint.
On what concerns our particular area of interest, the rise of independent 
candidates in recent politics of Eastern and Central European states has seldom been 
accompanied by the development of specific literature. Most contributions on the 
subject are consumed by depictions of failing candidacies, while more optimistic 
pieces are hardly to be taken into consideration as they provide an exaggerated 
account advocating independent politics. In most liberal democracies, almost all voters 
choose one party or another, with independent candidates receiving minuscule levels 
of support, if any1. This domination by parties is equally reflected in the literature 
on voting behaviour, where there has been very little research on why some voters 
choose to cast their ballot for independents2. Respectively, as independent politics 
have become fairly frequent after 1989 a new question emerges – why do voters 
show their support for independent candidates? This interrogation is to be addressed 
both for national politics and at sub-presidential level, precisely where independent 
candidates have their most significant impact. A possible answer could be the fact 
that citizens are increasingly searching for alternatives to traditional politics in an 
otherwise less visible part of politics: independents. Still, what about the motivations 
and behaviour of independent candidates – what makes them seek a highly risky 
alternative route to office? Scholars such as Timothy Colton argue that, for the 
overwhelming part of independents, their raison d’être is competing for the spoils of 
office3. We will further attempt to apply these methodologies to the Romanian case in 
our analysis of the peculiarities of independent candidatures in local post-communist 
politics. Nevertheless, we expect that our particular case at hand not to entirely 
correspond to any of these endeavours, keeping in mind the specific structure and 
the relative novelty of Eastern European democratic arrangements.
Voting for Independents
The term ”independent” is usually attributed to someone who is not affiliated 
with a political party4. Primarily, political independence encompasses the lack of the 
brand, the support and of the resources usually offered by a political party and, at the 
same time, it means pursuing a political path using own material resources, network 
of connections, know-how and political abilities5. Despite its underground position, 
independence responds entirely to the founding values of liberal democracies as it 
promotes political entrepreneurship and individual achievement to the best interest 
of the community. And contrarily to its accused centrifugal tendencies, political 
1 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation...cit.”, pp. 147-165.
2 Donald GREEN, Bradley PALMQUIST, Eric SCHICKLER, Partisan Hearts and Minds 
Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters, Yale University Press, New Heaven, 2002, 
p. 26.
3 Timothy J. COLTON, ”Transitional Citizens: Voters and Elections”, in IDEM (ed.), Post-
Soviet Russia, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 43-59.
4 Éric BÉLANGER, ”Antipartyism...cit.”, pp. 1054-1078.
5 Allan G. JOHNSON, Frank BEALEY, The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science, Blackwell 
Publishing, London, 1999, p. 163.
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independence helps the renovation of the establishment and equally serves the 
reformation of partisan attitudes by highlighting the often unseen flaws within the 
establishment. Likewise, independency might vary across circumscriptions, being 
motivated by numerous different political gains and stimuli, and producing dissimilar 
political consequences. This is why identifying circumstantial traits of political 
independence is crucial for better understanding the phenomenon at large within the 
specific region selected for analysis.
From an ideological understanding, independents are not required to assume 
centrist positions, but simply to develop their own system of political references, 
liberated from the strains of a political party. In the most basic understanding, 
independence removes the party label from the ballot, the candidate using his 
or her name alone for identification, together with the appellative ”independent 
candidate”1. For what concerns its qualitative attributes, the term independence 
might be understood as the lack of correspondence with partisan directives and 
as alternative to party candidacy – here, we have to mention that our thesis does 
exclude these so-called ”party mavericks” that act largely independently from their 
party machinery2. We consider these party-dependent actors to display a faux type 
of independence, as it does involve neither the true attributes nor the strains of non-
partisanship. Comparatively, genuine independence might surface as result of internal 
motivations of the political actor, without much relying on influences coming from 
the political framework or from the partisan setting. Usually, politicians annoyed by 
the current state of affairs get involved on their own in politics, attempting to bring 
their individual contribution to ameliorating the establishment3. Secondly, political 
independence can be triggered by severe dissatisfaction with the management done 
by representatives of political parties and in response to the corrupt ways proffered by 
partisan politicians. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the basic fact that independents 
candidates can be also recruited from partisan politics. Correspondingly, the literature 
sees former party members turned independent as representing quite scarce cases 
and being usually motivated by misunderstandings with former party colleagues4. 
Typically, these independency-motivating conflicts occur in the immediate period 
preceding elections being driven by the allocation of party nominations and by 
personal divergent interests5. It can equally be argued that the magnitude of the 
conflict helps the independency gather electoral momentum6. Conversely, we cannot 
overlook these particular recurrences by simply separating from the bulk of per se 
independent candidatures. Thus, a separate analysis of these so-called ”recycled 
independents” seems intensively necessary.
1 Art. 34 Align 5, Law No. 35/2008 on the Election of the Members of the Romanian 
Parliament.
2 Liam WEEKS, ”When Parties Are Not the Only Party in Town: Independent Actors 
in Ireland”, paper presented at the joint sessions of the European Consortium for Political 
Research, Nicosia, Cyprus, April 2006.
3 Liam WEEKS, ”Independents...cit.” , p. 149.
4 Elim PAPADAKIS, Clive BEAN, ”Independents and Minor Parties...cit”, pp. 97-110.
5 James D. KING, ”Comparing Local and Presidential Elections”, cit., pp. 277-290.
6 Brain F. SCHAFFNER, Matthew J. STREB, Gerald C. WRIGHT, ”Teams without 
Uniforms...cit.”, pp. 17-30.
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On the electorate side, a trend toward not claiming allegiance to a political 
party is visible1. But we should also notice that measuring political independence 
by research institutes is only one way of tapping partisanship and we also must not 
ignore the basic fact that partisanship can go hand in hand with non-partisanship 
in the case of the same voter2. Or, in other words, partisanship is multidimensional 
and, according to some scholars such as Richard Katz or Arthur Miller and Martin 
Wattenberg, for a correct understanding of political independence we should employ 
several partisanship measures and regard national surveys only as one of the needed 
instruments for that particular affair3.
Issue voting is expected to bring independents to the top preferences of the 
electorate. Together with partisan candidates’ positions on the broad issues such as 
economic development and environmental protection, independents often address 
more topical issues such as controversial reforms or support towards various actions4. 
It’s not simply enough to insulate the native effects of partisan politics such as bribery, 
inefficacies and rampant corruption in order to turn voter choice to independents. 
Nonetheless, managing to turn these particular issues into the centrepiece of the local 
race is vital to independents. Another occurrence, highly visible in the more recent 
post-communist elections in Romania, is that of the emergence of a significant block 
of potential voters which are mostly disconnected from politics, and which treat 
party organizations and party electioneering efforts with great indifference. These 
voters may thus be less susceptible respond to traditional political mobilization 
endeavours and, if they decide to get involved in any sort, end up being highly 
volatile in their electoral choice5. Structurally, this particular stratum of the electorate 
represents the main target for independents. Correspondingly, it can be argued that 
stirring the imagination of a substantial number of voters represents a demanding 
job for independents as compared to the easier path for party candidates who have 
the entire support of their organization, but, be that as it may, one could ask what 
makes independent candidates stick even after voters got a close look at them? 
One explanation might be the fact that they challenge the classical and often grimy 
understanding of politics6.
Taking further the position presented by V.O. Key on the abandoning of 
established partisanships by unsatisfied voters, we introduce the stance that electoral 
mobility favours the independent vote7. Especially younger voters seem prone to quit 
their inherited partisan affiliation and to adopt independent electoral views. And, 
1 Éric BÉLANGER, ”Antipartyism...cit.”, pp. 1054-1078.
2 Richard KATZ, ”The Dimensionality of Party Identification: Cross-national 
Perspectives”, Comparative Politics, vol. 11, no. 2, 1979, pp. 147-163.
3 Arthur H. MILLER, Martin P. WATTENBERG, ”Measuring Party Identification: 
Independent or No Partisan Preference?”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 27, no. 1, 
1983, pp. 106-121.
4 Liam WEEKS, ”Independents...cit.” , p. 141.
5 Elim PAPADAKIS, Clive BEAN, ”Independents and Minor Parties...cit”, pp. 97-110.
6 David GILLESPIE, Politics at the Periphery, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 
1993, pp. 47-48.
7 V.O. KEY, ”The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936-1960”, 
Harvard University Press, 1966, in Pierre BRECHON, Partidele politice, Romanian transl. by 
Marta Nora Ţărnea and Adina Barvinschi, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2004, pp. 142-143. 
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undeniably, conjecture plays a definitive role to all this1. Mainly because of the mobile 
character of the preferences of the voters, independents are forced to convince the 
electorate each time they present themselves at the polls. Therefore, winning the 
elections it’s more about occasional voters in the case of independents. Still, judging 
after another component of voting behaviour, such as social category and education, 
a clear-cut delimitation cannot be easily made. Voting for independent candidates 
represents a highly volatile experience, which can be equally approached by low-
income middle parts of the electorate as it can by higher-educated conservatives or even 
by older generations2. This is why voting independents might be rightfully catalogued 
as a highly circumstantial experience, being not that much about political habits as 
it can be about incidental decisions. But what motivates less faithful partisan voters 
to give their vote to independents? Is the political appeal of a particular candidate? 
Is it some radical transformation of the identity of the voter himself which occurred 
between elections? Is it the Internet? Or might the answer rely in the influence exerted 
by the mass-media? Or maybe it’s more of a combination of all the above?
And what can be said the local independent voter? Firstly, we should notice 
that, because of their critical attitude towards party politics, voters which usually 
reject independent candidates at the national level might become motivated by more 
contextual reasoning at the local level – and turn to giving their vote to independent 
runners. This would mean that the local level of politics offers the best chance for 
independents to win, further potentiated by the legal provisions which make hardly 
open the national sphere of politics to independent competitors, by the insufficient 
development of the party system, the widespread distrust in political parties, and 
also by the negative connotations of party membership maintained from the era 
of communist dictatorship3. Similarly to other countries which use proportional 
representation, in Romania independent candidates can run successfully for office, 
at least theoretically. However, thus far independents have failed miserably to win 
nationwide elections and independent representatives surface only during the actual 
term of the Parliament. This was possible for those leaving their original parliamentary 
group which got them elected in the first place and chose independent path because 
of different arguments they had with their former party’s leadership. Nevertheless, 
these recycled independents are highly susceptible to return to partisan politics, as 
their profile is highly prone to become incorporated in one of the competing parties’ 
ranks4. Comparatively, it remains a commonly accepted fact that voters are more 
inclined towards political parties especially as party identification is one of those 
shortcuts heavily employed in elections. And in the particular case when independence 
interferes with accessibility, we must expect people to be more resilient to change 
their habits. Current theory on the matter, however, considers that, in lack of partisan 
closeness, the electorate will seek out other, more encompassing information on which 
1 Phillips W. SHIVELY, ”The Relationship between Age and Party Identification: A Cohort 
Analysis”, Political Methodology, no. 6, 1979, pp. 437-446.
2 Franco MATTEI, Richard G. NIEMI, “Unrealized Partisans, Realized Independents, and 
the Intergenerational Transmission of Partisan Identification”, Journal of Politics, vol. 53, no. 1, 
1991, pp. 161-174.
3 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation…cit., pp. 74-79.
4 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă – politică şi societate în România postcomunistă, Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 1999, p. 89.
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to base their decision1. Voter decision making is visibly more difficult to manage for 
independents and in the case of less informed citizens this might even mean they lose 
their greatest information shortcut for making a cultivated vote. Some electors are 
expected to skip the election altogether, when they realise they are unable to determine 
clearly the differences between candidates or if they are little concerned to invest in 
time-consuming searches for pertinent information2. Those that eventually decide to 
express their political option might do that having in mind several other hints such as 
the politicians’ familiarity, background and his or hers programme3. For that matter, 
electoral geography studies underline the strong importance of the social context for 
the voting decision adopted locally4. Voters actually find out about their options by 
word of mouth, from their peers at the workplace or during other forms of social 
interaction. Interpersonal information transfers are complemented by the electoral 
contamination by which voters match their voting preference to the characteristics 
of an area, irrespective of their personal characteristics5. Working at a micro-scale 
such as that of local elections obliges us to better comprehend the basic fact that an 
important effect is the closeness of voters to candidates. Namely, the nearer one lives 
to a candidate’s home or has met him or her personally before, the more likely is one 
to vote for that candidate. This effect, which has been empirically proven by Liam 
Weeks and Aodh Quinlivan, might be extended in as much to affect those people 
that know somebody that have met the candidate6. This behaviour is explainable by 
admitting the fact that voters prefer someone they trust and from whom they hope 
to receive support in their dealings with the authorities. Equally, the position of a 
candidate’s name on the ballot paper can have a significant effect in terms of the 
number of vote he or she receives. This is particularly true for low-profile elections 
where voters are less informed about the background of the contenders and for lower-
placed positioned candidates such as independents. According to the provisions of 
the Romanian electoral law, independent candidates are placed at the bottom of the 
ballot following the order their candidatures were registered7.
The structuring of the electoral system, the personalization of voting and the 
particular character of independent candidates contribute to the consolidation of 
independents as viable alternative to party politics. All the same, independents are 
considered to be context-driven, as it would be most unlikely for voters to stick to 
independents the same way party supporters do. Nonetheless, it is hard to assess 
what does happen to independent preferences, if they fade away during the lifetime 
of a generation or if they can be transmitted generically as family legacy. Whatever 
1 Stuart ROTHENBERG, ”The Politics of Independents”, The American Enterprise, vol. 1, 
1990, pp. 13-15.
2 John ZALLER, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1992, p. 34.
3 David GILLESPIE, Politics at the Periphery, cit., pp. 47-48.
4 John Robert Victor PRESCOTT, Political Geography, Methuen and Co., London, 1972, 
pp. 85-88.
5 Kevin R. COX, ”The Neighbourhood Effect in Urban Voting Response Studies”, in David 
SWEET (ed.), Models of Urban Structure, D.C. Heath, Boston, 1972, pp. 159-176. 
6 Liam WEEKS, Aodh QUINLIVAN, All Politics is Local. A Guide to Local Elections in Ireland, 
Collins Press, Cork, 2009, pp. 90-92.
7 Art. 34 Align 5, Law No. 35/2008 on the Election of the Members of the Romanian 
Parliament.
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might be the case, independent voting can be best understood as a deviant political 
attitude, an assumption recurrent in the literature1.
Partisanship versus Independence
Essentially all governments that have called themselves democracies have 
incorporated however limited the idea of partisan organization. Equally, when 
democracy is established, as was the case for Eastern European countries not long ago, 
what seems a normal initiative of the new regime was to reinstate party activity2. The 
existence of democracy is directly connected to free and fair elections, with political 
parties being inherent for a functional democracy. Limited to observance about the 
changing place of political parties in the political systems of contemporary world, 
any debate on an eventual restructuring of party systems, even one to incorporate the 
independent labelling, maintains nevertheless some sort of institutional embodiments 
of the manifesting party logic. Continuing our argumentation on the idea of systematic 
interpretation of partisanships, we must take in consideration the most visible feature 
of partisan change, namely the erosion of partisan attachments among large numbers 
of citizens. Explanations found in the literature either consider the shifts of voting 
patterns, or adopt the attitudinal stance, insisting upon the decay of partisan feelings3. 
Both explanations stand, and both identify the growth of political independence as 
a reaction. The repercussions of such mounting independence are still under debate. 
Some authors consider that actually the escalading independence is rather superficial, 
meaning that many of those that would embrace the independent tag might even end 
up leaning towards one party or another4.
Given their centrality to modern democratic governance, the structuralism-
dominated literature on transitions has tended to focus on the importance of party 
system consolidation, emphasizing the importance of the electoral system, that of 
elections and party building5. In the particular setting of Eastern European countries, 
their communist rule produced a strong antiparty sentiment among the elites and 
voters alike. The young Romanian party system makes no difference, as initial 
partisanships lacked a coherent social base, a firm organizational form and thorough 
ideological programme6. Especially at local level, the parties penetrated more difficult, 
and this is highly visible in the enhanced electoral scores obtained by independent 
candidates in the early years of the transition. On the one hand, parties are accused 
that they simply aim to increase their electoral score in order to get access to more 
resources and to satisfy the interests of their supporters. These catch-all parties exhibit 
1 Arthur H. MILLER, Martin P. WATTENBERG, ”Measuring Party Identification...cit.”, 
pp. 106-121.
2 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation…cit., p. 23.
3 Timothy J. COLTON, ”Transitional Citizens...cit.”, pp. 43-59.
4 Jack DENNIS, ”Changing Public Support for the American Party System”, in William J. 
CROTTY (ed.), Paths to Political Reform, Heath, Lexington, 1980, pp. 35-66.
5 Juan LINZ, Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern 
Europe, South Africa, South America and Post-Communist Europe, John Hopkins University Press, 
London, 1996, pp. 156-160.
6 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation…cit., p. 104.
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an obvious degree of professionalization and find it easy to participate in a highly 
competitive political market. And especially because political parties which manage 
to attain electoral relevancy gain access to a series of advantages assured by the state 
such as public financing, political parties try to incorporate any available electoral 
entrance1. However, following Georges Lavau’s rhetoric we are entitled to argue that 
political parties, however functional and inclusive, cannot represent and integrate 
every particularity and social tensions existing within a society2. Here is where 
independents enter the scene, as they fulfil the need for political variety by speaking 
on behalf of those excluded by mainstream politics. 
Despite the prevalence of several main national political parties, the party 
system does not replicate wholly at all levels of the political competition. Regional 
specificities are commonly encountered, with numerous regional players having a 
say in local politics. The level of local politics represents a niche prone to be exploited 
by independent candidates, especially as the electoral system offers them several 
concessions to engage in the electoral competition3. Comparatively, at a time when voter 
turnout continues to decline together with the widespread lack of civic involvement, 
independent candidates offer the greatest personification of the resentment that many 
citizens feel toward major parties4. If political parties are universally understood 
as indispensable institutions for the functioning of democratic systems, one might 
argue that candidatures of independent politicians diversify the political options 
and contribute decisively to the maturation of the polity. Going further with our 
argumentation, dysfunctional parties might favour corruption and stagnation. This 
is why in any competitive democracy political independency is seen even more as 
relevant the moment political parties stop acting as regulatory responsible institutions 
and start affecting the very sanity of the political establishment. This negative approach 
towards political parties has been challenged by Martin P. Wattenberg, who considers 
that citizens do not immediately reject partisan structures, but rather they consider 
them less relevant in solving their uttermost important issues5. Therefore, rising 
levels of independence are not directly linked to sentiments of mistrust or scepticism 
expressed by the electorate towards political parties, but rather they are motivated by 
highly contextual reoccurrences6. 
Distancing themselves from partisanships, independents are believed to face 
several obstacles in their efforts of running for office as compared to the widely-accepted 
advantages enjoyed by party-supported candidates7. In the first place, independents 
lack any partisan support when they decide to forward their candidacy. Secondly, they 
rely mainly on a scarce amount of resources originating mainly from own sources and 
from a handful of supporters. To a similar extent, the voting mechanisms, the electoral 
context and financial resources play an equally important role in determining how 
1 Pierre BRECHON, Partidele politice, cit., p. 102.
2 Georges LAVAU, ”Partis et systèmes politiques: interactions et fonctions”, Revue 
canadienne de science politique, 1969, in Ibidem, pp. 125-127.
3 Liam WEEKS, Aodh QUINLIVAN, All Politics is Local... cit., p. 112.
4 David SEARS, Nicholas VALENTINO, ”Event-Driven Political Socialization and the 
Preadult Socialization of Partisanship”, Political Behaviour, no. 20, 1998, pp. 127-154.
5 Martin P. WATTENBERG, The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952-1980, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1984, p. 89.
6 Ibidem. 
7 David GILLESPIE, Politics at the Periphery, cit., p .19.
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well an independent can do at the polls1. Authors such as Arnold Fleischmann and 
Lana Stein which drew their conclusions from the national-level politics believe 
incumbency to be equally critical in local elections as well. Namely, those who have 
run previously in local races have the first chance in as much as their mandate has 
satisfied the expectations of their electorate2. But the system can be also forced by 
new candidates, and one of the main facilitator for new politicians to successfully 
advance their candidature is money. Spending cannot be ignored for local elections 
according to a growing number of studies from various countries, which attest the 
importance of local campaign funding as a determining factor of electoral outcomes, 
together with local canvassing and volunteer activities3. Though, since independents 
cannot rely on party funding for their political endeavours, their main sources for 
financial support are donations, which add to existing personal resources to finance 
their campaigns and, if legalized, to state subsidies. For example, according to the 
existing legislation on funding, Romanian independents do not enjoy public financing 
as they are not allowed to receive public budget subventions unlike political parties, 
their only source being donations4. At the local level the costs of running an electoral 
campaign are expected to be lower than the sums spent on national campaigns, with 
the similar predominance of political parties to be manifested. Within this particular 
setting, independents are expected to have the advantage of a smaller electoral 
population involving smaller costs. Nevertheless, who contributes financially to an 
independent’s campaign, and more importantly, why? Local businesses are identified 
as the main contributors by most scholars, while small donations are rather limited5. 
Together with the direct costs of modern politics, so-called administrative resources 
such as special treatment by the local government, funding provided illicitly from 
the state budget, free usage of state facilities, help political parties strengthen their 
position alongside indirect state subsidies such as free broadcasting and subsidies 
for parliamentary groups. Hence, the lack of a clear set of rules and strict control 
over political funding favours the incorporation of local political actors to centralized 
partisan structures and leaves little space for political independence to manifest6.
Party affiliation is a highly complex deal, and this was especially true in the first 
days of post-communism characterized by high scores in party volatility. Especially 
then the issue of truly admitting partisan status emerged, because not all candidates 
who belonged to party structures were also formally members of those respective 
parties, especially in 1992. This situation appeared as some candidates were afraid 
that openly assuming their party affiliation would alienate potential voters which 
remembered the rotten nature of the socialist party-state. These candidates enjoyed the 
support of various political formations, even they ran as independents, and, as soon 
1 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation...cit.”, pp. 147-165.
2 A. Clarke HAGENSICK , ”Influences of Partisanship and Incumbency on A Nonpartisan 
Election”, Western Political Quarterly, vol. 24, 1964, pp. 719-730.
3 Caty R. KENNETH, Munroe EAGLES, ”Do Local Campaigns Matter? Campaign 
Spending, the Local Canvass and Party Support in Canada”, Electoral Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, 
1999, pp. 69-87.
4 Law No. 334 from 17 July 2006 on financing the activity of political parties and of 
electoral campaigns.
5 Caty R. KENNETH, Munroe EAGLES, ”Do Local Campaigns Matter?...cit.”, pp. 69-87.
6 Steven D. ROPER, ”Campaign Finance in South East Europe: The Case of Romania”. 
Paper presented at the Workshop on Party Funding and Campaign Finance in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2-3 November 2001.
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as they got elected, they admitted their partisanship by joining the political party who 
supported them1. Therefore, we should be cautious when approaching independents’ 
performance in the early days of post-communism, particularly because this would 
mean to overestimate the number of independents. The evidence to support this 
view is quite impressive in present-day Eastern European post-communist politics. 
Strong partisans are fewer, spilt-ticket voting amplified, and parties lost much of their 
appeal, while scarce numbers of independents made their presence felt in local and 
national politics.
The Matter of the Electoral System
Independents face a hard time competing in a dysfunctional political framework, 
especially if the rules of the electoral technique were set to favour big political 
runners. Equally, political tradition plays a crucial role, influencing the performance 
of otherwise marginal contenders such as small parties and nonpartisan players. 
Because most partisan systems give an extra credit to large parties, the risk of under-
representation of minor voices and that of affecting independents’ performances is 
highly present and forces independent candidatures to adapt2. Every now and then 
a minor candidate can win the elections. But for most independent adventurers, 
experience shows that the electoral system in most democratic countries nowadays 
favours a party-centric competition for national elections combined with candidate-
dominated elections occurring mostly at regional and local levels3. Of course, 
exceptions exist and confirm the fact that independent candidates are prone to make 
the best of all those small opportunities the electoral system has to offer. 
Though, opening the rigid partisan establishment to small players at the expense 
of big political interests is not an easy thing to do. This is highly visible for post-
communist politics – here, political institutions were designed by plagiarizing 
Western political practice, but the transformations were accompanied by the 
incomplete adopting of political pluralism outside the party realm4. Nevertheless, 
because independents act in the same institutional environment as big parties do we 
should not ignore the basic fact that institutional mechanisms that regulate political 
competition and influence the nature of the partisan system were designed with the 
parties in mind5. Then again, independents depend greatly on various characteristics 
of the electoral system, such as seats allocation rules or ballot access requirements (e.g. 
deposits or lists of signatures). Within a highly competitive electoral system, lax ballot 
access requirements permits independents and small parties to enter the race, while 
in rigid polities, independents might even be banned altogether for entering certain 
types of elections6. Together with ballot access requirements, other intrinsic features 
1 Frode BERGLUND, ”Party Identification...cit.,”, pp. 84-105.
2 Hermann SCHMITT, Soren HOLMBERG, ”Political Parties in Decline?”, in Hans-Dieter 
KLINGEMANN, Dieter FUCHS (eds.) Citizens and the State, cit., pp. 95-133.
3 Stefano BIANCHINI, ”Political Culture and Democratization in the Balkans”, in Geoffrey 
PRIDHAM, Tom GALLAGHER, Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans, 
Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 67-71.
4 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation… cit., p.52.
5 David C. VALENTINE, John R. VAN WINGEN, ”Partisanship, Independence, and the 
Partisan Identification Question” American Politics Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 2, 1980, pp. 165-186.
6 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation...cit.”, pp. 147-165.
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of the electoral system which dominates certain electoral competitions influence the 
electoral performance of independent candidates. Among these, the extent to which 
a competition is candidate-centred or party driven is crucial for independents1. We 
should also notice that the dimension of the electoral district is vital for independents, 
as large circumscriptions are difficult to cover2.
Furthermore, the type of voting system constitutes a major factor in shaping the 
configuration of any political system and represents one of the most vital institutional 
features to discriminate against small political actors. According to its design, 
mechanisms, effects at different levels, one can distinguish numerous variations 
of electoral systems, each of them developing specific relationships with the larger 
institutional framework. The same variables which influence the competition between 
political parties have significant repercussion for independents – namely, the electoral 
formula employed, the ballot structure (whether single or multiple choices can be 
expressed for candidates or parties) and the district magnitude3. Electoral system 
design is of critical importance because it influences the way in which constituencies 
are drawn, the design of ballot papers, how votes are counted, and numerous other 
aspects of the electoral process. With similar effects can be credited other administrative 
aspects of elections such as the nomination of candidates or the registration of voters, 
but their influence is believed to be rather limited for independents. And particularly 
because the design of the voting system is often chosen at the discretion of established 
political parties, electoral laws tend to be specially made so that they protect partisan 
interests. This manipulation of the electoral system by an unscrupulous majority 
usually encourages the performance of political parties and disadvantage individual 
candidates. Likewise, despite the fact voting systems are de jure democratic, being 
guided by key principles such as fair representation, transparency and inclusiveness, 
the practice shows they actually limit the chances of small political parties and of 
independents4. 
Widely encountered throughout Europe, proportional representation systems 
tend to be more permissive and to encourage a greater diversity of parties and of 
individual political contenders5. Allowing multiple ballot choices, proportional 
systems are more likely to facilitate the success of small political formations, and hence 
open electoral opportunities for independent candidates. This argument is highly 
criticized by Russian-originating studies which argue that proportional representation 
systems help party system further consolidate6. Comparatively, majority and plurality 
systems are expected to decrease the electoral strength of independent candidates 
and small political formations, due to the way seats are being distributed favouring 
large competitors and making voters turn away from marginal candidates. Some 
authors maintain the idea that, because it dampers the connection between parties 
and voters, and makes voters more candidate-aware than label-dependent, majority 
and plurality systems encourage independent candidates7. Nevertheless, it’s hard 
1 Ibidem, pp. 147-165.
2 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem.
5 Josep M. COLOMER, Political Institutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 44. 
6 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation...cit.”, pp. 147-165.
7 Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy… cit, pp. 141-146.
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to assess the recurrence of these theses, when only relying on single-case studies of 
independent candidatures. Certain commentaries regarding the confrontation between 
the dynamics of independent candidatures and that of certain subtypes of electoral 
systems are well-needed here. We presume that any electoral circumstance which 
puts a great emphasis on the candidate itself and its personal attributes and neglects 
the party labelling is creating opportunities for independents. Similarly, threshold 
is equally important for the electoral performance of independent candidates, with 
lower electoral threshold helping parties recuperate the disadvantage they face as 
compared to members of political parties. In the case of local elections, the two-round 
voting system employs winner-takes-all voting method for the first round of voting, 
and, if no candidate is able to receive an absolute majority of votes, the two candidates 
which obtained the highest scores take part in the second round run-off ballot1. As the 
practice shows it, ballotage has been affected by various practices of tactical voting: 
voters go for the most popular candidates or, au contraire; they rather support a weak 
candidate in the first round of voting, so that their real preferred candidate has a 
better chance in the runoff2. This latter practice might help independents credited 
by opinion polls with little chance to gain momentum and enter second round. The 
presence of a distinctive electoral system might provide an explanation for the success 
of independent candidates in a particular setting according to some scholars3. But 
this is not entirely true for our case, if we take into consideration the fact that the 
provisions of the electoral system remained arguably the same since the first local 
elections, while the vote for independents diminished considerably over time4. One 
explanation for this brutal decreasing might be the maturation of the partisan system, 
which managed to capture most of the voting preferences, while limiting the electoral 
performance of small competitors.
We attempted to assess the electoral strength of independent candidates 
by comparing the percentage of candidates that present themselves using the 
independent label in elections, the percentage of votes that independents receive and 
the number of mandates captured by independents. Therefore, facing the numbers 
in the Romanian case, we end up with these numbers as an average for the past five 
electoral cycles: out of the bulk successful candidatures, independents won 10.45% 
of the vote and about 9.58% of the available mandates. Comparing these figures with 
those Dawn Brancati obtains in his comparative study on political independence we 
can place Romania on the weaker spectrum of independent politics5. For Romanian 
local politics a proportional representation voting system was in place since the 1992 
elections in the case of local and county councils, while a two-tier majority voting 
system is used for electing mayors. This inconsistency between the types of elections 
used at local level was further extended in 2008, when a new electoral law opened to 
public will the function of president of county council, via a single tier majority vote. 
And precisely because of the nature of this varied arrangement highly dependent 
1 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.
2 William POUNDSTONE, Why Elections Aren’t Fair (and What We Can Do About It), 
Macmillan, London, 2009, pp. 34-38.
3 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.
4 Paul G. LEWIS, Political Parties...cit., pp. 81-83.
5 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.
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on the political colour of the centre majority, numerous vicious situations surfaced 
among central and local authorities in the past two decades. 
Independents by Law
According to the Romanian electoral laws, independents are seen as electoral 
competitors in legislative, presidential and local elections. Compared to the legal 
instability which characterizes the concept of political party in post-communist 
Romania, the legal definition given to independent candidates was rather constant 
all throughout the period of transition. Nevertheless, political independence is 
interpreted in legal terms as the monopoly of individuals which advance on their 
own political candidacies and receive the support of a particular number of voters1. 
Following this logic independence defines itself using the personal criteria combined 
with the popular dimension of political support.
 In line with the Romanian standards, parliamentary mandates are accorded 
using uninominal majoritarian vote distributed proportionally. At this particular level 
of politics, independent candidates are allowed to enter legislative elections having 
them provide a minimal number of signatures from their supporters, number which 
is decided for each uninominal college, but has to equal at least 4% of the number of 
the voters registered in their respective college, with no less than 2000 names for the 
lower chamber and double for the Senate2. Also, the law stipulates that independents 
running for a legislative mandate, similarly to party-supported candidates, need to 
make proof of a deposit consisting of the amount of five minimum national wages. 
If these independent candidates manage to get at least 20% of the total amount of 
valid votes for the college where they competed, the deposit is returned to them. 
According to the same piece of law, independents have access to the public services 
of radio and television, proportionally with their electoral significance, the same 
being true about their possibility to use the special boards for electoral posters3. In 
order to obtain a mandate in the legislative, independents need to win the majority 
of votes in their electoral college and do not benefit from any special treatment as 
their partisan counter candidates do, such as redistribution bonuses. Despite the fact 
legislative elections do not represent the focus of our research, we cannot ignore some 
basic facts regarding the political performance of independent candidates at that 
particular level. Our first observation would be that independent candidatures were 
advanced for both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. All these independent 
attempts at winning a legislative seat failed especially as result of the exigent nature 
of the rules in place at this particular level of politics. With the requirements for both 
registering a candidature and for covering the circumscription rocketing as compared 
to the state of thins at the local level, it is no wonder no actual independent candidate 
1 Art. 26 Align 1 and Art. 30 Align 1 of Law No. 35/2008 on electing the representatives to 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of Romania, together with Law No. 67/2004 on electing 
the Authorities of the Public Local Administration, the Law of Local Public Administration 
No. 215/2001 and Law No. 393/2004 on the Statute of Local Representatives with subsequent 
modifications.
2 Art. 29 Align 7, Law No. 35/2008.
3 Art 38 Align 1, Law No. 35/2008.
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managed to surpass the threshold and to get a mandate. At best, the scores obtained 
by independents managed to pass the average of three percent. One particular 
detail not to be ignored is the presence of recycled independents in the Parliament, 
originating from failed partisanships. Their ranks vary accordingly to the stability of 
the legislative session, with more castoff independents surfacing in very combative 
political setting.
For presidential competitions, independents need at least 200 000 signatures 
in order to advance their candidatures, and enjoy similar provisions as members 
of political parties and of alliances do1. What became highly visible in the past two 
decades of post-communist politics is the very fact that independent candidatures 
for the supreme function in state were rare, and most of them can be categorized as 
fair exceptions. In 1992 and 2004 there was a single independent candidature, while 
in 2009 we can easily spot no less than three independents running for president, 
the back-then mayor of Bucharest, a Roma ethnic and a businessman. Among these 
candidatures we encounter only one woman which presented herself to the polls as 
independent, a lawyer which ran in the 2000 elections. Similarly, just one independent 
attempted to run for president more than once, in the 2000 and 2009 elections. In 
the case of presidential elections the situation for independents is somewhat 
ameliorated to what we noticed at the parliamentary level. Still, for most occurrences 
of independence in nationwide politics, these numbers are highly exceptional. For 
example, during the past two decades and over the past five electoral cycles only 
one presidential candidate forwarded his independent candidature twice. At the last 
presidential elections independents failed to raise the interest of the people, with all 
three independents getting under four percent of the votes2. 
On the other hand, in the case of the elections organized for the representatives to 
the European Parliament, independents are permitted to run under the proportional 
representation formula, providing the fact they raise 100 000 signatures. This number 
appears to be too exigent, as compared to the requirements parties need to meet in 
order to forward their electoral lists3. Also, similarly to the other types of elections, 
independents are placed in the last part on the ballot, after candidatures from parties 
represented in the European Parliament and other parties and alliances are satisfied. 
Likewise, independents’ presence in public media is also subject to party premiership. 
Nonetheless, independents might get one of the available European legislative 
mandates if they manage to surpass the national electoral coefficient, established 
by law as being the rapport between the total number of votes expressed nation-
wide and the number of mandates attributed to Romania4. For the past European 
parliamentary elections held in Romania, it was highly visible that independents 
can hardly penetrate the partisan monopoly. But, similar to other Eastern European 
polities, Romania was confronted with scarce recurrences of independent players 
managing to reach needed score, most of which usually emanate from high-profile 
typecasts within the establishment. One of the most visible electoral settings remains 
1 Law No. 370 on Electing the President of Romania from 20 September 2004.
2 Stan STOICA, Dicţionarul partidelor politice din România 1989-2004, Meronia, Bucureşti, 
2004, p. 83.
3 Art. 12, Law No. 33 from 16 January 2007 on Organizing the Elections for the European 
Parliament.
4 Art. 20 Align 2, Law No. 33/2007 on Organizing the Elections for the European 
Parliament.
71
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XI • no. 1 • 2011
Independents in the Local Politics of Post-Communist Romania
Bucharest, retaining a symbolic importance for the state of the entire nation and with 
capacity to irradiate the remainder of the electoral body. After the first four mayors 
appointed by governmental decision, since march 1992 Bucharest experienced five 
mayors belonging to one of the political parties, and an independent1. In 2004 the only 
independent candidate for the office of general mayor managed to obtain a meagre 
score of 0.15% of the total vote. Four years later, a former social democrat turned 
independent as result of internal quarrelling with his party colleagues decide to run 
as independent for this seat. He obtains 56, 55% of the votes, managing to defeat the 
representative of the most important political party in Bucharest over the previous 
years2.
At local level, independent candidatures can be proposed for local and country 
councils, and for the mayor’s office. Independents which wish to run for any of the 
available councillor position need to enjoy the support of at least 1% of the total 
number of voters registered in their circumscription, but at least 50 for communes, 100 
for small towns and 1000 for counties, the capital city, Bucharest districts and large 
towns3. Those who wish to run for mayor’s office, need to make proof of the support 
of at least of 2% of the total number of voters registered in their circumscription, but 
no least than 200 for communes, 300 for cities, 1000 for large cities and districts of 
Bucharest, while 5000 signatures are needed for the Bucharest4. This particular aspect 
of the electoral legislation led to discriminatory practices against independents, such 
was the case of the only successful independent candidate to the office of mayor-
general, which was confronted with the ultra-correctness of the Municipal Electoral 
Bureau5. Nonetheless, these numbers do not seem to represent a direct problem for 
independents; they even appear to be provoking independency at the local level. On 
the other hand, on what concerns women’s participation as independents at local 
elections is highly dependent on each candidate’s strength to participate as no gender 
quotas are in place. The proportion of women competing independently for office 
is rising gradually, but remains very small up to the present as compared to the 
experience of Western Europe on the matter. And, this seems especially visible at the 
regional level, where a more patriarchal understanding of politics seems to remain 
in place6. The law discriminates against independent candidates in the case when 
no political formation or independent candidate has managed to pass the electoral 
threshold, when the mandates are redistributed among these partisan groups, with 
independents being excluded from the formula from the very beginning, according 
to the d’Hondt rules for redistributing unused votes7. Furthermore, according to the 
1 Cristian PREDA, ”Al nouălea primar postcomunist al Bucureştiului”, Studia Politica. 
Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 2, no. 5, 2005, pp. 503-506.
2 Central Electoral Bureau, June 2008 elections for the authorities of the local public administration, 
http://beclocale2008.ro/ (accessed on 12.04.2010).
3 Art. 48 Align 1, Law No. 67/2004 on electing the authorities of the local public 
administration, republished. 
4 Art. 48 Align 2, Law No. 67/2004 with subsequent modifications.
5 Public Policy Institute, Alegerile locale 2008 – organizare inerţială, candidaţi apatici, alegători 
indiferenţi, IPP, Bucureşti, 2008.
6 Ionela BĂLUŢĂ, ”Le Parlement roumain à l’épreuve du genre. Les femmes politiques 
dans la législature 2004-2008”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 10, no. 1, 
2010, pp. 123-151.
7 Art. 96 Align 8, Law No. 67/2004 on electing the authorities of the local public 
administration, republished.
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electoral laws for local elections, electoral publicity is permitted, with independents 
enjoying free access to the public radio and TV stations as well as to private media 
station1. Unlike candidates of political parties which benefit of greater airing time for 
their electoral announcements, independents can dispose of only five minutes for 
their public broadcasts. Independents can also present their political offer on public 
places specifically selected for electoral posters. 
As noticed, independents face several obstacles in winning political office. Though, 
as we can easily observe, ballot access requirements are pretty permissive at local 
level, with signature requirements being rather easy to meet, and even without the 
large infrastructure of a political party independents are able to reach eligible voters. 
Monetary deposits are omitted for independents that participate in local elections 
and therefore do not pose any obstacle to independents at this particular level of 
Romanian politics. Still, compared to other Eastern European countries, ballot access 
requirements seem rather volatile in the area, ranging from quite burdensome deposit 
requirements and large signature requirements to exemptions targeting various ethnic 
or social groups. For example, Hungary, Moldova, Poland and Russia lack any sort of 
deposit requirements for independent candidatures, while Estonia removed signature 
requirements as well2. Nonetheless, there are systematic differences in the contexts in 
which local contests are fought, differences that account for the relative success of an 
independent candidate in one election and the failure of another candidate four years 
later. Among contextual factors contributing to the electoral success of independent 
candidates we identified low levels of partisanships, dissatisfaction with major party 
candidates, economic discontent, issue preoccupation, distrust towards mainstream 
politics3. Then again, we consider that electoral performance is not all about the 
characteristics carved within the electoral system and consequently, that an eccentric 
candidate can obtain maximal electoral advantage by employing unorthodox 
campaign tactics. For that reason, in the next parts of the present scrutiny, we intend 
to evaluate the systematic explanations for independent success in local politics by 
examining contextual changes that occurred from 1992 until the latest elections of 
June 2008. We also intend to analyse the bases of independent candidates’ support, 
an average profile of the Romanian local independent candidate and the political 
outcome of independent candidatures.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Local Politics in Romania
At a first glance the last two decades in the history of the Romanian party system 
can be characterized by great variance in the number of composing political parties, 
by the numerous alliances and splits which marked the transition from the single 
1 Art 65, Law No. 67/2004 on electing the authorities of the local public administration, 
republished.
2 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.
3 John CAREY, Matthey Soberg SHUGART, ”Incentives to Cultivate the Personal Vote: 
A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas”, Electoral Studies, vol. 14, no. 4, 1995, pp. 417-439.
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party to multipartidism1. An obvious place of political volatility, the Romanian 
party system has been greatly scrutinized by numerous authors, whom mainly 
approached its dynamics from an institutional perspective, either analysing the 
parties as organizations, or by approaching their relations to the electorate and to the 
act of governing2. Few studies have turned their attention to independents within 
the Romanian establishment, and those which did approach the subject were mostly 
tributary to the national level of politics3.
Manifested mainly through a growing sense of alienation from political parties, 
the erosion of partisan loyalties within the Romanian electorate represents one of the 
most obvious political developments characterizing the past two decades4. Fewer 
citizens identify with either of the major parties, more voters are splitting their tickets 
on the day of the elections, and generally there is a growing sense of alienation from the 
political parties5. The capacity of political parties to serve as representative institutions 
in democratic politics is hardly contested in its entirety; nevertheless the weakening 
of party attachments is a reality of nowadays post-communist politics. For example, 
Richard Rose and William Mishler claimed that citizens of post-communist countries 
approach with scepticism party politics, scepticism caused by the dissatisfaction 
with the economic situation and by their approval of the perceived benefits of the 
previous non-democratic era6. Although economy is picking up as compared to the 
situation at the beginning of the 1990s, trust in political parties remains low as the 
last Eurobarometer survey shows7. Hence, we find it necessary to overcome Rose 
and Mishler thesis, and for this matter we suggest two elements which might affect 
the performance of political parties in most post-communist countries: the limited 
transparency of the establishment and its reduced pace of incorporating contradictory 
sentiments. Additionally, we plan to integrate the warning forwarded by Daniel Barbu 
about the fact that elections provide an incoherent mirroring between popular wishes 
and political representation, and, instead, each electoral scrutiny is in fact reproducing 
partisan privileges8. Especially by assimilating this interpretation, we can better 
understand that independents are severely affected by this inherent component of the 
Romanian political system and that their political performance is highly dependent 
on the electoral unattractiveness of the representatives of the main political parties. 
More precisely, this particular situation is best portrayed by the basic fact that, despite 
the stigmatisation of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe as corrupt and 
1 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic din România, Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2008, p. 58.
2 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation… cit., p. 10.
3 Alexandra IONAŞCU, ”The Evolution of Parties Supporting Government Forms of 
Patronage in Post-Communist Romania”, Sfera Politicii, no. 123-124, 2006, pp. 62-76.
4 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.
5 Richard KATZ, ”The Dimensionality of Party Identification...cit.”, pp. 147-163.
6 William MISHLER, Richard ROSE, ”Learning and Re-Learning Regime Support: 
The Dynamics of Post-Communist Regimes”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 41, 
no. 1, 2002, pp. 5-35.
7 According to the most recent Eurobarometer survey, political parties ranked next to last in 
terms of public trust in institutions across most Eastern European countries. http://ec.europa.
eu/public_opinion/ (accessed on 15.03.2010).
8 Daniel BARBU, ”Can Democracy Be its Own Enemy? The Intended Consequences of the 
2004 Romanian Elections”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, 
pp. 9-17.
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unrepresentative bodies, independents scarcely managed to recuperate the lost ground 
in the last two decades of democratic transitioning. Correspondingly, the same author 
defines the Romanian political system as “partidocracy”, cultivated by the list vote 
used until recently which rewarded political parties at the expense of small political 
actors1. At the level of the local administration this is highly visible, with little space 
left to nonpartisan and opposition actors to exist, despite the variance of electoral 
tools used here. As already noticed, partisan pre-eminence is highly cherished within 
the establishment. Resulting from the preferential allocation of resources, this system 
of patronage produced the migration of local elected representatives accordingly 
to the best party in power – a system which at least formally was stopped by the 
emendation of the Law 393/2004 on the Statute of the Local Representatives2.
Nevertheless, the real power of local administration is given by decentralization; 
an imperfect one for the Romanian case, as it continues the administrative tradition 
set by communism which it tries to patch with local autonomy and public services 
decentralization while neglecting the national setting3. This particular situation made 
local facilities such as education, public transport, roads, water, and sewerage, land-
use planning, cultural and recreational facilities to be highly targeted by partisan 
interests. Equally, local elections have become especially important in countries that 
are experiencing, or have recently undergone, transition from authoritarian rule to 
more open political systems, as the viability of local elections gives an impression on 
the success of the general process of transitioning. However, how can we rightfully 
test the efficacy local governance? Some authors propose we should check whether 
the issues of immediate relevance to citizens are debated and tackled. Equally, 
others believe minorities’ inclusion can rightfully serve as an indicator4. For that 
matter, we consider one indicator that should not be ignored for establishing the 
viability of local politics is the success of independent candidatures. But instead of 
formulating any hasty appreciation regarding the independents’ particular place 
within the Romanian local politics, we should keep in mind the basic fact that every 
four years the number of local administrative units increased5. This particular feature 
promoted to the interests of political parties, helps as well independents competitors 
in providing them with another chance to advance their candidatures. Yet, before 
systematically approaching the peculiarities of the Romanian political establishment, 
we consider utterly necessary to go through the general features of the system, all 
of which we believe to interfere with the political acceptance and performance of 
independent politicians. In Romania there are 41 administrative denominations, plus 
the capital city. Bucharest has a distinct administrative arrangement, being divided 
into six districts each with its own mayor and local council. The capital city is run by 
a general mayor and a general council. Each of the 41 counties has a governing body, 
the county council, with an average of 34 members which are being elected through 
a proportional representation system since 1996. Starting with the 2008 elections, the 
1 Ibidem, pp. 148-150.
2 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul…cit., p. 57.
3 Ibidem, p. 54.
4 Samuel HUMES, Eileen MARTIN, The Structure of Local Government: a Comparative Survey 
of Eighty-one Countries, Internationa Unit of Local Authorities, The Hague, 1969, p. 34.
5 Social-Democratic Institute, Raport supra alegerilor locale din România, SDI, Bucureşti, 
2004, p. 4.
75
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XI • no. 1 • 2011
Independents in the Local Politics of Post-Communist Romania
president of the county council is elected as well throughout a uninominal scrutiny1. 
At the locality level, the local council is elected through a proportional representation 
system. Therefore, getting many votes is useless if not accompanied by belonging to the 
most significant coalition. Within this particular setting we might argue that political 
independence is highly damaged, because of the rare occurrence of situations where 
independents win a majority of seats in the local councils. Consequently, winning a 
seat in the local council as independent requires significant bargaining skills in order to 
turn an individual position into that of an indispensible partner in coalitions. Another 
fair observation would be the basic fact that candidates for councillor positions are 
visibly more obscure and face a low-profile position in the electoral campaign, despite 
the importance of this office in forwarding local reforms. 
Accordingly to the electoral law, the local public authorities which accomplish 
the principles of local autonomy are the local councils as deliberative authorities 
and the mayoralties as forms of the executive power2. In each county a council is 
established with the purpose of cordoning the activities of the local authorities. The 
vote expressed for local and county councils are considered to be highly political 
and the results of these particular levels of politics to be highly important for the 
result of the parliamentary elections, as it provides the main political parties with 
testing grounds for their electoral reach3. Within this particular setting, independent 
candidatures are given little chance to occur, especially at the county level where 
parties make tremendous efforts at pushing their candidates. For example, with the 
modifications brought to the electoral laws after 2004, the county level was hardly 
penetrated by independents, with barely one mandate obtained at the last two 
elections. The examples of the latest elections for county councils show us that only 
a high-profile independent can successfully met the requirements for competing at 
this level. Furthermore, the single independent county councillor elected for the 2008-
2012 mandate decided to quit his independent coating and joined the ranks of the 
main political parties as a natural political move which best responds to his political 
beliefs4. So, we might rightfully ask why did he run as independent in the first place? 
According to his own statements independence was the only possible path for him 
at the time of the elections because his union affiliation interfered with his political 
calling. In what concerns the recently introduced elected office of the president of 
county council, it seemed to be virtually impossible for independents to accommodate 
on a short notice to such a demanding office. Therefore, independents which ran for 
this seat in 2008 managed to get only 0.61% of the total number of votes and failed to 
procure any mandate whatsoever. Comparatively, independence has occurred more 
successfully within a particular local context: the mayoralties. As stated by the law, 
the head of the local administration is the mayor, which is elected through a popular 
vote. The local executive is being elected through a majority two-round system, 
similarly to that applied to presidential elections, with a vivid importance given to 
1 Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina TĂNĂSESCU, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice, 
C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 86.
2 Art. 21 Align 1, Law No. 215/ 2001 regarding the local public administration.
3 Arnold FLEISCHMANN, Lana STEIN, ”Campaign Contributions...cit.”, pp. 673-689.
4 ”Singurul independent din Consiliul Judeţean Covasna s-a înscris în PSD”, Cotidianul, 
http://old.cotidianul.ro/singurul_independent_din_cj_covasna_s_a_inscris_in_psd-90608.
html (accessed on 15.03.2010).
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individual characteristics such as the candidate’s background, social position and 
personal accomplishments to the disadvantage of political affiliation. These particular 
features of mayoral competitions make room for smaller runners as compared to those 
permitted to successfully run in county and local councils.
Independency occurred throughout the past five electoral cycles in both urban 
and rural communities, more developed or poorer localities, within ethnically 
divided and as well within more homogenous areas. Also, throughout the past 
two decades, independence candidates running in local elections approached their 
electorates mentioning primarily some of the following issues on their electoral 
materials and in their public appearances: the necessity of administrative reforms, 
social issues, local economic development, and modernization of the infrastructure. 
Although designed with the immediate interests of the community in mind, the local 
elections were confronted during the past twenty year with a visible lowering of 
the electoral presence. With the exception of the first post-communist local elections 
when almost 65% of the total number of valid voters expressed their political will, 
for the following four electoral cycles the presence stabilizes around 50%1. At a first 
sight, the low interest showed by the electorate as compared to the scores obtained 
for general elections would led us believe that the voters consider local polls to be 
less important than general elections and ignore that community-level politics might 
develop unpredictable countless repercussions. But despite the marginalization of 
local elections, it became obvious after the June 2000 polls that the main political 
parties rely heavily on local level of politics to test their political strength. In the same 
way, the enlarging of partisanships at the local level became even more poignant 
with the stabilization of a few political parties which manage to get the majority of 
local mandates, at the expense of small political organizations and independents. For 
example, for the last elections, 90% of the total number of mandates was granted to 
the main parties, with barely 2 percent of the total number of candidates managing 
to win office independently. At this point, we consider that several characteristics 
inherent within the establishment need to be highlighted in order to continue our 
scrutiny on local independence. One of the most significant influencer was the 
introduction of the electoral threshold of 5 percent right before the 2004 elections, 
which led to the reduction of the number of the represented parties at the local level 
and also to an even more concentrated permeability for independent runner. An 
equally important modification was the surfacing of the law on financing electoral 
endeavours and the reduction of the period reserved for campaigning from 45 to 30 
days2. We believe that these modifications posed further problems to smaller political 
actors and especially to non-parliamentary formations, because their reduced size and 
scarce resources makes it difficult to efficiently reach a vital segment of the electorate. 
Another highly common practice affecting independence is represented by the luring, 
blackmailing or even forcing elected officials to abandon their independent stance and 
to join a political party3. Independents might become subject to political constraining 
1 Cf. data available on the webpage of Romanian Electoral Authority: http://roaep.ro/ 
(accessed on 15.03.2010).
2 Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina TĂNĂSESCU, Drept constituţional…cit., pp. 63-65.
3 Sorina SOARE, ”Quels modèles partisans pour l’Europe Centrale et Orientale? Étude 
des structures organisationnelles des partis politiques roumains”, Studia Politica. Romanian 
Political Science Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, pp. 21-48.
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especially in regions traditionally identified with partisan politics, where political 
formations are expected to pressure non-partisan mandate holders to join their ranks 
and to condition their access to public resources on their partisan adoption. Similarly, 
weak independent holders of mayoral office can be further affected by the opposition 
of representatives of political parties, if the latter chose to back the partisan deputy 
mayor to the disadvantage of non-partisan political actors. During their mandate, 
independents are highly expected to find themselves confronted with numerous 
other similar situations that will test the strength of their independence. 
Several other aspects affecting the recurrence of independency within post-
communist setting are to be discussed further. One of them would be the Hungarian-
dominated regions in Romania. One might rightfully expect that in every locality 
where a majority of ethnic Hungarians is present, the representatives of Democratic 
Union of Hungarians in Romania to hold the monopoly. Without a clear-cut ideology, 
this political formation representing the interests of ethnic Hungarians in Romania 
contains numerous civic and cultural associations and organizations as well as several 
Christian-democratic political parties. The Union passed all five post-communist 
electoral tests and was co-opted in all governmental coalitions established after 1996, 
as result of its successful ethnic mobilization practices. Drawing its substance from 
the nationalist tensions of the beginning of the 1990s and with a faithful electorate, 
the Union managed to get about 150 mayor’s office, 2500 local councillor positions 
and about 130 county councillors throughout the last five post-communist electoral 
polls. At its first European scrutiny, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania 
got 2 mandates and one of its most prominent members running as independent 
managed to get a nomination for the European Parliament1. With the county councils 
visibly dominated by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania in Harghita 
and Covasna, it would seem equally true this control to be maintained for mayor’s 
office2. Nevertheless, accordingly to the available figures one can rightfully say 
that precisely in the regions inhabited predominantly by Magyar ethnic a higher 
number of independent politicians managed to get into office as compared to the 
other parts of the country. This observation can equally be applied to other counties 
where Hungarians are present, such as Mureş, Satu Mare, Bihor, Sălaj, Cluj and 
Arad3. Therefore, it is highly necessary to investigate these recurrences further and 
to find out precisely what motivates independency in this particular area. Another 
characteristic of the Romanian political system which is present to a higher degree at 
the local level is clearly the intersection of politics and Orthodoxy. With the clerical 
structures intertwining with the modern state since the latter’s inception, the Eastern 
interpretation of Christianism is a significant public manifestation to be confused with 
the democratic exigencies4. With structural traces originating in the Byzantine epoch, 
the Orthodox Church strengthened its administrative connections to the Romanian 
state up to modern times and developed its institutional strength based on a collective 
national character5. During the communist era and afterwards, the Church treated 
1 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul…cit., pp. 223-224.
2 Ibidem, pp. 165-166.
3 Stan STOICA, Dicţionarul partidelor politice...cit., pp. 105-108.
4 Daniel BARBU, ”Can Democracy Be its Own Enemy?...cit.”, pp. 282-283.
5 IDEM, ”Etica ortodoxă şi spiritul românesc”, in IDEM (coord.), Firea românilor, Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2000, p. 80.
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its followers’ religious intimacies as if they were of public and even of state interest1. 
Denying the secular character of the Romanian state, the Romanian Orthodoxy 
advances its practices in each and every corner of the society and this is highly visible 
at the local level where the clergy represent one of the main focal points2. And exactly 
political independence was targeted by the representatives of the Church, especially 
as they cannot find themselves in any partisan or confrontational circumstances which 
would lead to the secularization of the religious time and would risk the particular 
place reserved to the Church within the social order. Precisely because in traditional 
local confines the priest represents not only a moral authority but also an important 
local figure, political involvement of the church’s clergy seemed more than a natural 
outcome. Still, what motivates these priests’ political independent endeavours in the 
first place? Is simply a likely extension of the church entanglement with the state? 
Or is it more about personal motivations of the clergy itself? We will attempt to 
satisfy these academic enquiries departing from the explanations provided by the 
protagonists themselves. It is now time to evaluate the performances of independent 
politicians in the particular setting proposed by the recent local elections in Romania 
and to assess their evolution throughout the post-communist decades. In the following 
analysis, we will be guided by the considerations introduced previously, having in 
mind the theoretical framework proposed in the first part of our scrutiny. Therefore, 
we shall voice equally the importance of the votes won by independent contenders 
throughout the past two decades, as well as individual analyses of the independents 
which engaged in the most recent local electoral competition that took place in post-
communist Romania. A separate focus will be built around independent politicians 
who ran and managed to win these elections, approached comparatively from the 
perspective of the previously announced themes.
Current Status of Political Independence 
in a Post-Communist Setting
Before starting with our analysis on the situation of independents at the local 
level of post-communist Romanian politics, we should take into consideration 
several aspects relating to the particular dynamics of our study. Firstly, we cannot 
simply aggregate the available data as we would mistakenly be led to an improper 
understanding of independent politics. We also consider that a full evaluation of the 
recurrences of independency should go beyond the strictly electoral phase and tackle 
the need for separate approach in the competition for county councils, local councils 
and mayoralties. Moreover, we should not overrate the predominance of political 
parties as well as we should escape the attraction towards a heroic interpretation 
of independent candidacy. And not last, an analysis focused on the local politics is 
highly dependent on the particular arrangements that are in place at that level, which 
should be best understood by comparing them with similar institutions active all over 
Eastern Europe. Having the above-mentioned observations in mind, we should start 
1 IDEM, Republica absentă – politică şi societate în România postcomunistă, 2nd ed., Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2004, p. 287.
2 Olivier GILLET, “Religion et politique dans les Balkans. Les enjeux contemporains”, 
Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 269-277.
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our investigation from the crude picture implied by the popularity of independents 
in local politics all throughout the country. The appended tables present the electoral 
performance of independent candidates that won at least one mandate in any of the five 
post-communism polls organized locally in Romania. What we first observe is the fact 
that, with every new electoral cycle, fewer independents managed to fruitfully advance 
their candidature. In 2008 we reached a situation where only 56 mayor mandates were 
obtained nationwide by independents, 358 independent candidates got a nomination 
as local councillor, and barely one independent became county councillor whereas 
no successful independent candidature was possible for the position of president of 
the county council1. This situation seems somewhat problematic if it were to compare 
it to the numbers of the first post-communist elections, when 22.4% of mayoralties 
and 6.54% of the local councils belonged to independents. Some explanations for this 
situation were advanced previously, when we mainly referred to the certain setting 
specific to the beginnings of the Romanian democracy and to scarce consolidation of 
the political parties. In the next segment of our examination we intend to offer further 
clarifications on the abrupt declining of the magnitude of independence in the local 
post-communist politics, especially by integrating the views independents themselves 
have on the matter. Then again, by comparing the latest scores with the ones from the 
period of democratic stabilization, we can fully assess that independence is degrading 
with each electoral cycle in Romania. We should now question what truly motivates 
those scarce numbers of independent to forward their candidacy, even within this 
restrictive electoral setting. 
When studying independence at the local level, one has to bear in mind that 
local elections are chiefly about small electoral competitions. But nevertheless, within 
this micro electoral setting, a visibly greater importance is given to bigger cities and 
particularly to residence cities. Unlike smaller political units, independents competing 
for the open positions in bigger localities need to mobilize a larger number of voters 
and are more exposed to media and partisan attacks. From our available data it 
would seem that big local political units represent the most vulnerable spots for local 
independency, with eight towns, four county residences and one of Bucharest sectors 
captured in 2004 and barely five cities, one county residence and the office of the 
general-mayor in 20082. Even as we should expect a worsening of these scores with 
the coming elections, we consider them being more about circumstantial occurring. 
By far, the most noticeable incidence of independence at the top tier of local politics 
is represented by partisan derails. The most striking example of counterfeited 
independence is that of a former social democrat which ran as independent candidate 
for the office of mayor of one of the six Bucharest district after his exclusion from his 
party due to allegations of corruption. After winning the office from the first round, at 
a comfortable 27% margin he returned to his party3. This example does not entail that 
in bigger communities independence is less articulate or truthful or that more visible 
political units might turn into favourable grounds for façade independence. Instead, 
what we can observe is the smaller penetration of independents in larger localities, 
1 See Appendix: Table 1 – Mandates Won by Independents at the Local Elections (1992-2008).
2 See Appendix: Map 1 – Political Independence across Romania after June 2008 Local 
Elections.
3 Mihaela AVRAM, ”Marian Vanghelie se întoarce în PSD”, BBC Romanian, http://bbc.
co.uk/romanian/news/story/2004/06/040629_vanghelie_psd.shtml (accessed on 12.04.2010).
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which might be explainable by the difficulty of covering such a large circumscription. 
We now consider opportune to propose and test the validity of a differentiation 
between partisan, intermediate and non-partisan circumscriptions, defining the 
latter as political places where independents gain from the first electoral turn. Highly 
partisan circumscriptions can be defined as where either no independent candidature 
was ever advanced or no independent candidate manages to reach the second round. 
From observing the available data, we can easily argue that localities in the centre and 
Northern part of the country are more open to independent candidatures, whereas 
the Western and North-Eastern parts are generally sporadic hosts for independency, 
with communities situated in the South-West allowing little penetration. We consider 
these situations as a measure of the local context and socio-economic attributes, with 
more developed places showing an increased rate of approval for independents. 
Also the ethnic component plays an important role, with ethnically divided regions 
allowing to a greater extent independency to happen. One major observation that 
is mandatory to be made now would be that, despite its low scores, independence 
can be characterized by continuity at the local stage of post-communist politics. 
Palpable manifestations of steady independence can be identified in those regions 
where the electorate prefers non-partisan actors with each election, no matter their 
persona. This is the case of several localities in the county of Covasna (Ilieni, Ojdula, 
and Sânzieni) and Harghita (Brădeşti, Păuleni-Ciuc). Offices repeatedly won by the 
same independent candidate as is the case of two localities in the county of Satu Mare, 
Certeze and Livada represent another particular manifestation of interdependency-
prone places. 
There are a number of ways in which independents can be conceptualised and 
categorized, some of clearly drawing upon and relating to classification of political 
players at national level such as ideology or electoral magnitude. We purposely 
ignored such a classification because it little served the interest of our scrutiny of 
independence understood as purposed avoidance of party labels by politicians. 
Instead, we proposed a distinct categorization, namely one that would allow us to 
distinguish true independents, which propose their candidatures autonomous of any 
external inferences and have no history of partisan activity. Secondly, we can identify 
recycled independents, a variety more commonly met in post-communist politics as they 
usually emerge from failed partisanships being former members of political parties 
which decided to ditch partisan affiliation and pursue their political career solitarily. 
Another subtype of independence is represented by faux independents, which can 
be easily distinguished from the other two kinds due to its dependency on outside 
support. This third variety largely represents a perverted type of independence, and 
refers to any politician that publicly denies any connection to any political party, but 
in fact, he or she represents the interests of that party locally. Another variant, that 
belongs more to the partisan spectre, is represented by party members who distance 
themselves severely from party line. This last category was essentially ignored by our 
study, as its members essentially belong to a political party and have fallen out with 
the party whether over a matter of principle or on other conjectural grounds for short 
periods of time. These breeds of independence are essentially visible in the Romanian 
local politics, with certain kinds being more represented than others depending upon 
the characteristics of the corresponding electoral moment. For example, we might 
consider that the highest degree of genuine independence occurred after the first 
post-communist electoral cycle, with more and more recycled independents making 
their appearance with each new electoral moment. This general overview should 
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permit us to advance our analysis to the next step. Our primary findings indicate that 
independent-driven politics is possible at local level for a variety of reasons. One of 
them would be the growing discontent with the major parties, manifested particularly 
through a sentiment that political parties prolong corruption and wastefulness. More 
than anywhere else in the establishment, voters are in search of more alternatives, as 
consequence of their discontent in the mainstream parties coupled with a fundamental 
erosion of faith in political parties themselves. The need to solve pressing issues brings 
the electorate closer to the person which is best fitted for that job, no matter his or hers 
political affiliation. Voting mechanisms, electoral conditions and a candidate’s financial 
resources play a large role in determining how well an independent candidate can do 
at the polls. Equally, frustration towards political parties can be observable on the side 
of the politicians, which might turn to independency as their last resort. On the other 
hand, independent attitudes can be also favoured by the intrinsic determination of 
certain political actors to help their community.
For distinguishing the impact of political followership we compared the total 
number of votes expressed in local election with number of votes obtained by 
independent candidates. We then compared this data with the nationwide performance 
of independents during the past five electoral cycles. Several implications can be 
drawn from the figures we analysed. Firstly, it becomes clear that the success of 
independent contenders diminishes with each election. Hence, there appears the 
question why this happened – and the most plausible explanations seem to be the 
fact that independence faces financial hardships coming from highly centralized 
governance. Also determinant for the weakening of independents’ scores is the further 
maturing and strengthening of the partisan system. Second, the data at hand suggests 
that the independent tag has substantial effects on the structure of local vote, which 
nevertheless remains dependent on the broader aspects populating the establishment. 
In particular, there seems to be a significant voting bias in favour of medium educated 
candidates coming generally from technical backgrounds. This situation can be best 
explained by looking into the broader composition of the local administration, where 
we could easily observe the recurrence of similar profiles1. Before going further 
with our analysis, it is necessary to say that exceptions are possible, and might be 
furthermore promoted by the importance accorded by the voters to the personal 
criteria. 
In our attempt to profile independents in local elections we selected several 
variables to represent personal characteristics (educational level, professional 
background etc.), political resources (the type of rhetoric employed, incumbency) and 
political success of this type of political contenders. We further addressed the interview 
material and additionally available data through the lenses of certain main themes we 
considered helpful for answering our research questions. Among these themes, we 
reserved considerable space for clarifying what motivates independence at the local 
level, what might be the advantages and the disadvantages of independent politics, 
how independents approach their electorate and manage to sponsor their campaign, 
their particular situation in office, their relation with partisan politics and their 
propensity towards re-election. Analysing the data gathered we come to the following 
candidate profiling of independents in local elections for the period at hand. In terms of 
personal characteristics, independents tend to be male (95%), mainly Orthodox (70%), 
1 Şerban OLAH, Elitele locale, Editura Economică, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 317.
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middle aged (mean of 54 years), both Romanian and Hungarian ethnics (one third), 
originating from rural areas of the country (9 out of 10), more likely not to be college 
educated, nor to hold an advanced degree. By profession independents originate 
generally from technical specialities, and usually have had their own business prior 
to advancing their candidacy. He or she is more likely to count the advantages of 
incumbency, and to have a limited access to financial resources, most of which come 
from personal sources, and from business partners or close friends.
But let us take a closer look at a general profile of independence by going through 
some of the profiles of independents interviewed. We consider that the best means 
for approaching individual situations of independence which occurred at the last 
electoral cycle would be to integrate them within the general framework of this 
examination. In order to provide this study with the greatest possible perspective 
on the background of independence in post-communist times and at the same time 
to better understand how does independence truly manifests itself nowadays, we 
interviewed independent politicians in office, randomly selected from all over the 
country. In designing the selections needed for research, we made sure that our choice 
to represent best how independence is currently distributed across Romania, with 
more attention given to those spaces where independence is more visible. Firstly, as 
stated before, what could best motivate politicians to run as independents might be 
their failure to procure a party nomination. Comparatively, as our findings show, most 
independent candidates previously did seek for party nomination, this being especially 
true for politicians in counties controlled by the Democratic Union of Hungarians 
in Romania. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that independence can also be 
motivated by the expulsion from partisan ranks. Secondly, as is the case for an equally 
significant part of independents, independence is expressly preferred in turn to party 
candidacy. This is largely possible thanks to the electoral system which is in place at 
local level, which permits independent candidatures. Nonetheless, in order to further 
approach what motivates independence at the local level, we must turn our attention 
to what independents themselves say about their particular situation. To begin with, 
independence can be triggered by the detachment from partisan politics. B.T. from a 
locality in Covasna said he chose to run as independent because he never felt close 
to any political party. L.O., running for the first time as independent in 2008 in a 
locality in the Iasi County, said he sought for change within his community and also 
wanted that corrupted politics which was proffered by a ”partisan clan” in the last 
twenty years to stop. The same mistrust in and dissatisfaction with partisan politics 
was accused by the mayor of an important town in Maramureş, P.V., which advanced 
his independent candidature for the first time in June 2008. Another independent 
voice originating from the Braşov County told us he ran because ”[political parties] 
are all the same” (I.B.). Originating from a rural community in Satu Mare, C.P. says he 
seized the opportunity as he saw that the electorate in his locality is disappointed by 
partisan politics and decided to run independently. Asked what he thinks about his 
counter-candidate which also assumed independency, he told us that his competitor 
did it as the last resort, being unable to mobilize the support of any political party. 
On the other hand, the mayor of a locality in the Covasna County, B.E., said he ran as 
independent as a measure of his trust in politics: ”If politics is truly fair, it should not 
matter if I belong to a party or not”. Other type of rhetoric we encountered among 
independents was one that explains independence in terms of popular demand. For 
example, L.G. from the Vaslui County considers his independent candidacy to be the 
result of the wishes expressed by the people in his community. A former member of 
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a political party, F.C. agrees with this: ”It was not me; the community pushed me to 
run as independent”. M.M., after three mandates as mayor of an important city in 
Harghita, described himself as different from ”those independents which have passed 
through seven or eight parties”. M.M. also says he feels proud about the fact he never 
was member of a political party and it was the people that helped him decide to 
stand as independent. C.B., an independent from Cluj at his first mandate said that 
his independent candidature was motivated by the annoyance he felt towards the 
backwardness of his locality. Another independent from Covasna County said he 
felt he was capable to do something to help his locality, but did not want ”to work 
in the interest of the parties”. Previously identified as top motivators for political 
independence, failed partisanships are also recurrent in practice. Several examples 
are required. F.I. from Covasna ran as independent in June 2008 after previously being 
vice-mayor of the locality on behalf of a political party. On the other hand, originating 
from a locality in the Cluj County, another independent considers that unfair politics 
he experienced during his previous four mandates as representative of a political party 
made him engage independently (S.I.). He wished to measure his political performance 
as compared to that of his former party, especially as he lost his support right before 
the elections. Another example of failed partisanship turned independence is that of 
S.E., who after previously representing a political party, was not summoned to run 
again in 2008. Therefore he had to stand as independent. A similar situation was met 
by M.A., which had two mandates on behalf of a political party before advancing 
his candidature in 2008 as independent because of a misunderstanding with his 
former partisan supporters. With a quitted partisan adherence, A.B. thinks that what 
motivated his independence was the fact he did not wanted to be under the control 
of a political party. During his partisan experience, A.B. admitted to have witnessed 
some unfair happenings which provoked his independence. Oppositely, L.Z. from 
Harghita held the office of mayor as representative of a political party, but decided 
in 2008 to quit his partisan allegiance: ”I never dropped my ideological legacy” he 
added. After a failed candidature on behalf of a partisan structure, P.I. admitted his 
candidature as independent in June 2008 was motivated by the fact he could not get 
the nomination from one of the political parties. L.S. ran as independent incidentally, 
as he decided to late in order to procure a party’s nomination. Running his campaign 
he found out that was the best choice, especially as the voters seemed to manifest 
their disapproval with all political parties. Another frequent situation we met was 
that represented by politicians who continued to remain in office after the fall of 
communism as independent mayors, especially because they already accumulated 
certain renown in their locality and also developed all their needed local connections 
before 1990s. Ironically, one of them who won in June 2008 his fifth mandate as 
independent said he was not interested to subsume himself to party politics as he 
knew what that means and it was the people who asked him to return. 
”I have a bad opinion about partisan life, they [politicians] follow by all 
means the interests of the party and their own interests. The moment they get 
elected they forget what they’ve promised because the parties lack the strategies 
needed to develop local communities” 
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continued this independent (A.C., Călăraşi County). Another case of communist-
supported independence is that of P.R., who considers that, because he was a high-
profile figure before 1989 in the locality, he won the mandate as vice-mayor in 2004 
and the mayor’s office in 2008. 
Other politicians chose independence as their only available alternative – this 
being the case of B.D., a civil servant in Covasna, as the law does not allow civil 
servants to be part of political parties1. Similarly, following his participation in a 
non-governmental organization that mediated between centre politics and local 
administration, B.B. decided to run as independent, especially as he was unable 
to identify a political party that could best answer his political plans. Then again, 
political independence seems to serve as an important political tool in ethnically 
heterogeneous areas, permitting otherwise marginal voices to successfully forward 
their candidature. Independent mayor of a city in Satu Mare for the fourth time, S.I. 
said he chose the independent path as he did not want to hurt the feelings of any of 
the inhabitants of the locality, no matter their ethnic origin. In the same way, M.R. 
decided to run as independent in June 2008 because he saw it as the only possibility 
to get into office in a community controlled by ethnic Magyars: 
”The people told me that my only chance is to run independent because 
they were fed up with the promises they received from political parties”. 
Orthodoxy and independence seems to be highly compatible, with numerous 
priests and small local clergy getting involved in politics using the independent label. 
Asking G.B., a priest which got re-elected four times as independent in the Argeş 
County what motivates him to run, we received this blunt answer: 
”After forty years of service as a priest, I decided in 1996 to continue 
to work for the people even as a retiree. Everybody asked me to do it and, 
without thinking, I got elected. Clearly the fact that I was the priest helped my 
candidature”.
He then added that, if he were to run again, he will follow his independency, 
because he thinks ”as mayor I’m not allowed to get involved in any political party, I play 
game of the people not that of the politicians”. Another priest that ran independently 
in 2008, N.G., said his clerical belonging does not permit him to participate in any 
political party. Instead, he also acted as independent local councillor before advancing 
his candidature for the mayor’s office. Reaching this point in our analysis, we can 
rightfully say that, for what concerns the local level of post-communist Romanian 
politics, independence has multiple motivations. For numerous independents, their 
particular profile came either because they never identified with a political party, either 
as reaction to the will of the people, either provoked by quitted partisan allegiance, 
by mistrust in the political system, either by the ethnical context, either because other 
options were not possible or as particular manifestation for revamped communist 
origins. 
1 Art. 40 Align 3, The Constitution of Romania, http://cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339, 
(accessed on 15.03.2010).
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For what concerns their attitude towards partisan arrangements, independent 
politicians seem to share the opinion that the party politics are profoundly rotten. 
One candidate which now is at his fourth mandate considered that ”it’s hard, it’s 
extremely hard for us [independents], as the others [partisan politicians] know how 
to lie and steal” (G.B., Argeş County). Another one added ”let them fight in their own 
way” (L.O., Iaşi). L.Z. said that the political system is a chaos at the present moment 
and the local administration is the worst affected by the lack of vision and improper 
organization. Also, he believes that repeated conflicts among political parties have 
deceived and estranged the electorate. On the other hand, P.V. thinks politicians are 
best examples of dilettantism. Comparatively, N.G. believes that first and foremost 
the laws need to be respected, and, despite what should ideally happen, political 
parties attempt to evade the control of lawful institutions by all possible means. P.I. 
thinks that, in partisan politics, everybody cares about his own interest. M.R. believes 
”[partisan politicians] are all the same, they don’t wish to budge a thing”. Equally, 
independents see a minimal role for political parties. Some said political parties 
should mind their own business, other considered parties to lack clear-cut ideologies 
leading to political derails. Another voice thinks political parties are cliques brought 
together by personal interests, where everybody expects something in return. A.C. 
from Călăraşi says he feels he doesn’t belong to partisan politics, as he despises being 
controlled by and serving the interests of political parties. The same independent told 
us that political parties are determined by vanity and he provided us with the example 
of the local council in his locality where an independent was chosen as vice-mayor 
only because political parties could not agree whom to name from their own ranks. 
B.E., an independent from Covasna at his first mandate, considers political parties 
should rethink their role within the society because ”they’re getting more and more 
irrelevant by the day”. Likewise, after a previous experience with a political party 
and from his position as independent, F.I. considers that parties should reform their 
current place within the society and start to promote in the first place correctness, 
Christian values, and morality. B.D., another independent from Covasna, said he sees 
the main political parties as being extremely powerless and inefficient in their efforts 
to serve the citizens. Coming also from a Hungarian-dominated locality, A.B. said it 
more bluntly: 
”Present-day politics is a disaster, and this is why I believe the role of the 
independents to grow with the passing of time, especially because of the weak 
political performance generally displayed by the Romanian political class”.
A rare independent voice in the Sibiu County, B.B. considers that our political 
system is still in its infancy, as ”they [political parties] yet have to define their long-term 
intentions and values”. Similarly, S.E. thinks political parties should quit developing 
their clientele and instead support the growth of local communities. P.R. said that 
political parties grow interested only before electoral moments, and thereafter they 
ignore local politics until next elections. N.G. admits he is quite upset on the political 
parties because politicians are not taking their job seriously and they only criticize and 
blame one another without providing any solutions. Henceforth, because partisan 
politics is seen as corrupt, lacking long-term vision, being characterized by frail 
organization, internal conflicts, clientelism, inefficiency, independents associate it 
with a marginal role within the society. In the same way, sympathizing with political 
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parties seems to remain generally a taboo for local independents. Among those who 
agreed to convey their political preferences, one priest elected as independent said 
humorously that he does sympathize with other politicians, because ”I baptized them 
all” (G.B., Argeş). Another independent from Cluj admitted his sympathy for the 
ecologist movement (C.B.). Similarly, one independent from a traditionally Magyar 
majoritarian county, admitted straightforwardly his sympathies (F.I., Covasna). 
Another ethnic Magyar, S.E., admitted his partisan sympathy, but accuses that 
party to have ignored him. Most independents consider that electoral campaigns 
are highly problematic events for their independency, especially as they lack the 
professional and material contributions a party usually provides its candidates with. 
Nevertheless, some also accuse political parties of interfering with the electorate in 
an illegal manner, by attempting to change their political will via bribes, and various 
other small gifts. In general, electoral campaigning at the local level poses smaller 
problems, especially as the financial effort is expected to decrease accordingly to the 
size of the circumscription. Mayor of a small city in Harghita, M.M. said he ran all his 
three electoral campaigns without much effort, with just few banners and posters, 
despite the heavy mobilization of the political parties against him. Similarly, F.C. said 
his posters kept disappearing, and he believes political parties are to be blamed for 
that. Also at his first mandate, N.C. admits to have faced a difficult campaign due 
to the unfair fight waged by the former mayor. L.S. faced in the second tour of the 
elections the opposition of all local political parties. Similarly, P.I. said advancing his 
candidature was highly difficult because of the attacks coming from political parties. 
Then again, P.V. believes the attacks he was confronted with originating from political 
parties are natural, as everybody wishes to win.
Oppositely, C.B. admits he escaped any interference from the political parties 
basically because nobody expected him to represent a threat. He adds ”to be honest, 
my campaign was quite obscure, just a few posters. Nevertheless, I had a close 
relation with most of the people here”. B.D. admits he underwent a similar path, as 
he invested little in his campaign and relied greatly on his familiarity with the people. 
Others used their quitted ”political colouring” hoping to impress the electorate. For 
example, owing his fame to his former three mandates as representative of a political 
party, one candidate did not even displayed electoral posters in June 2008 (S.I., Satu 
Mare). M.R. admits he was known by many people in the community because he 
had the advantage to have previously worked in the mayoralty since 1995 as a civil 
servant. Formerly a member of a political party, S.E. believes that the most difficult of 
the campaign was to raise the signatures. On the other hand, he enjoyed the support 
of some small businesses which paid for his campaign materials. As a matter of fact, 
most rurally-based independents did not procure professional services for promoting 
their image during the electoral campaign and simply limited to printing their 
own posters and leaflets. N.G., a priest from Maramureş, said he ran his campaign 
without telling any bad words about his counter candidates. N.G. further added that 
he financed his campaign himself with the help of some close friends as he did not 
wish to become tributary to others. Nevertheless, during the 2008 electoral campaign 
he spotted material bribes coming from political parties, especially targeting poorer 
people easily to persuade: ”The voters are selling their vote because they are hopeless 
about their situation”.
A.B. acknowledges as well to have enjoyed the support of some local sponsors, 
specifically because ”the independent candidate has to do everything, nobody helps 
him”. Enjoying the support of his friends, B.B. raised the needed signatures and 
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distributed his electoral materials. Comparatively, B.B. considers that the greatest cost 
of his campaign was the time spent meeting the electorate. P.I. said the highlights of 
his electoral campaign were represented by two gatherings, together with the classical 
means of campaigning (banners, posters, leafleting etc.). Mainly, local electoral 
campaigning in the case of independents is characterized by the little importance 
accorded to political label as compared to the personal traits of candidates, by the 
reliance on private contributions, limited inference of professional techniques, together 
with bonuses accorded by incumbency and by a previously established high-profile 
presence. For independents, the problems involved with financing their electoral 
campaigns differ accordingly to the independents’ personal material power and to 
the level and magnitude of the circumscription; with larger ones being more difficult 
to cover and requiring added investments. One candidate previously supported by a 
political party said he feels the lack of party money, as ”nobody is willing to contribute 
to an independent’s campaign” (S.E., Satu Mare). On the other hand, F.I. adds that 
he financed his campaign from half of his monthly salary. B.T. thinks that in small 
localities independents are helped by the fact ”everybody knows everybody else” and 
do not require large investments in the electoral campaign. F.C. said something similar, 
considering that money was not that important for his campaign, instead what he 
believes to have been crucial are the personal contacts he established with the voters. 
Most of the independents interviewed which originate from the business environment 
face an easier challenge, as they can finance their campaign themselves. For example, 
L.O. said he financed his campaign from his own pocket. P.V. did the same, being an 
administrator of a private business. B.E from the Covasna County identified close 
friends with businesses as his main financial supporters, whom contributions added 
to the money he invested personally. Especially those with numerous mandates won 
as independents say they do not need an expensive campaign, as they proposal is 
simple, being centred on their familiarity: ”This is me; this is what I can do” said 
proudly A.C. from Călăraşi. Being largely known in the locality, M.A. admits he only 
copied few of his old posters and distributed them. L.Z., a former mayor on behalf of 
a political party now turned independent admits he continues to somewhat enjoy the 
support of that party, but the money needed for the electoral campaign were provided 
from his own personal savings. Hence, financing independents’ campaigns is largely 
characterized by the lack of public subsidies, which are compensated by donations 
originating from private supporters such as friends, small businesses and business 
partners. Equally, we should notice that incumbency lowers the costs involved with 
running local campaigns, and also in the case of local independents money can be less 
important than personal contacts.
Few independents seem to really understand the advantages of their position. 
Some consider themselves exceptions: I.B., an independent at his first mandate 
having scarce partisan background, thinks that, because of the instability of the 
general establishment, independency offers added stability and autonomy during 
party reshuffling. ”Being in normal relations with everybody else” seems to be highly 
needed for the performance of independency as the same politician thinks, because 
”otherwise [belonging to a political party] might imperil the access to information 
and funds at times“. Similarly, B.B., L.G., and C.P. consider that independents bear the 
advantage of being able to address any institution and political party, as long as he 
presents himself as somebody who wishes to do something for his community. ”Not 
being under the control or at the command of anybody” is seen as the main advantage 
by one independent originating from partisan politics. Originating from Covasna, 
B.D. provided us with an extremely positive outlook on independence after two years 
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of his first mandate as independent mayor, saying that he found no disadvantage to 
independence and added he received all the needed funds, despite his lack of partisan 
allegiance: ”I cannot say that being independent is helping me as I can’t say it affects my 
mandate”. Still, it might be argued that this particular case, the independent benefited 
from his ethnic common denominator with the representatives of the dominant party 
in the county. With a similar optimist stance, M.M. considers that independents 
are more credible in the eyes of the electorate. Additionally, L.Z. considers that in 
local politics, the party matters less, and the electorate is mostly interested in the 
personal traits of the candidate, and this particular situation helps independence. All 
in all, independence offers politicians constancy no matter the partisan coating of the 
governing body, it gives the ability to equally address institutions indifferent of their 
political fidelities, and might proliferate electoral trustworthiness.
The political allocation of money is seen as one of the top disadvantages by our 
interviewed independents. This situation was radically described by one independent 
previously elected four times on behalf of a political party, as he compared his current 
situation with the period when he was aided by his party: ”If you don’t belong to a 
political party, nobody takes you serious” (M.A., Timiş). But for other independents, 
this is hardly the case as they might find themselves under the spotlight; either as 
this would mean accusations coming from partisan competitors. A conflicting county 
council endangers even more independency, as it can interfere with the allocation 
of resources. P.V. believes that the main problem faced by independents is that they 
hardly can make themselves heard, because administration is highly politicized. 
S.E. agrees to this position, as he believes independents are highly dependent on the 
will of the governing party and that of the president of the county council. The lack 
of the support of a political party is accused by B.T. as one of the most important 
shortcomings independents have to face, especially as he needs to accommodate the 
interests of various representatives of political parties. M.M., a Romanian mayor in 
Harghita believes the disadvantages of independence are even worst in his case, as 
the particular arrangements of the area act against him: ”It’s not easy to work with a 
council entirely subsumed politically, and it requires compromising, diplomacy and 
patience”. On the other hand, another independent from Covasna considers that the 
local council poses little problem to independent as long as everybody acts to the best 
interest of the community (F.C.). An independent mayor from the Călăraşi County 
sees no major advantages in assuming independence, but he believes “independents 
continue to be treated as pariah” (A.C.). C.B. accuses interference from top politicians, 
as he received numerous calls to mind his own business. Comparatively, S.I. from 
the Cluj County remains confident about the disadvantages of independence as he 
considers good politicians can turn them to their own advantage. He tells us that 
the only problems he met when forwarding his projects were caused by incomplete 
papers, which he later remediate. Discriminated against when they need to receive 
public funds, more prone to partisan attacks and encountering difficulties in accessing 
highly politicized structures are seen as the main disadvantages of independency – 
nevertheless, independents managed to survive them while, even more, being able 
to complete their projects. The success of their projects depends on whether they are 
at their first mandate or they enjoyed re-election. In rural areas, most independents 
take pride in their ability to complete projects such as water supply, ecologic trash 
management and disposal, sewerage systems, infrastructure, tourist and leisure zones, 
modernization of roads, schools, gas supplies, control of pollution in agriculture and 
rehabilitation of green spaces, whereas independents which serve as mayors of both 
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small towns and municipalities believe restoration of historic buildings, parking 
spaces, expansion of touristic places, ameliorating of existing infrastructure to be 
among their top achievements. Most of the independents we interviewed said they 
rely greatly on attracting European funds for completing their projects, and equally 
feel the interference of parties which hope to control as much funds as possible for 
helping their own members. G.B., an independent at his fourth mandate, said that 
”I have too many projects to count, all totalizing about 30 million euros”. Also at 
his fourth mandate as independent, S.I. said he never asked for the help of political 
parties, but he nevertheless got numerous sponsorships through various sources 
such as Sapard or Phare. In completing their assumed projects, independents usually 
are confronted with a partisan-dominated local council, with scarce cases when an 
independent mayor is able to cooperate with an independently-driven local council. 
For example, M.A. said he feels the lack of independents in the local council, and he 
blames this situation on the electoral law which favours the candidates of political 
parties: ”Independents had 70-80 votes and those who won a mandate as local 
councillors on behalf of political parties had barely 30”. Others admitted bluntly the 
fact that their independence is provoking the opposition of local councillors, which 
refuse to cooperate. P.V. says he believes that the difficulties he faced were provoked 
by the fact he lacks the party brand. M.R. highlights an aversive situation within 
the local council, with his opponent from the second round of the 2008 elections 
provoking numerous fights. He believes that with the next elections, people will elect 
more independent local councillors, in order to avoid such situations. In contrast, one 
mayor with a history of no less than five mandates told us he manages to limit the local 
council by explaining each project in detail and making them realise it has to be made 
for the interest of the people (A.C., Călăraşi). Similarly, F.I. considers that his relations 
with the county and the local council were aided by his previous participation in 
local partisan politics. Three of the interviewed mayors from Covasna told us that 
they equally enjoy the help of independents and that of partisan representatives in 
the local council, especially thanks to the heterogeneous composition of the council. 
A.B. thinks that thanks to his previous experience as member of a political party he 
collaborates quite well with the local and county institutions. N.G. said he did not feel 
to be put aside as independent, and he maintains a good relation with the president 
of the county council and with the central administration. Also, P. I. said that what 
matters most in developing good relations with the political parties is the way the 
problems are being addressed: ”Talking nicely helps a lot”.
Asked if they sought re-election, independents provided us with contrasting 
answers. Some said they barely wait to finish their mandate and escape the pressures 
of independency. For example, one independent said that he spends the greatest part 
of his mandate in courts and paying administrative penalties, as he is being sued by 
the local councillors belonging to the political parties (G.B., Argeş County). L.O., an 
independent which managed to obtain an office in a locality that belonged for the 
past twenty years to various representatives of political parties, said that the former 
mayors have filled trials against him. Therefore, he added he barely wishes to finish 
his mandate because he feels he cannot handle it anymore. Also disappointed with 
the way independents are seen in Romania, several other independents (M.A., P.R.) 
confessed they will not attempt re-election. Faced with the burdens of independence, 
one independent with deep partisan legacies admitted that he will most probably 
return to party politics, but this time as part of another formation (M.A., Timiş). I.B., 
an independent from Braşov County, said that depending upon the general situation 
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near the time of the elections, he will decide if he maintains his independent label 
or will go for a partisan ticket. Others said that, keeping in mind their success as 
independents, they will most probably maintain their label. Confidents in their 
political future as independents, B.D. M.R. and P.I. said they will most probably run 
again in 2012, particularly as they already have some finished projects to take pride 
in. We encountered this belief in the reconfirmation of their independence mostly 
from politicians originating from Covasna, Harghita, Mureş. L.Z, A.B, and F.C. from 
Harghita, and B.B. from Sibiu also believe they will ran again in the 2012 elections, 
as long as they manage to successfully finalize most of their political promises. All 
things considered, the label of political independence will most probably stick to 
those politicians that were most successful in advancing their political programmes, 
and to those which will run in those places predisposed to independence, whereas 
failed partisanships turned independent will most probably generate future 
partisanships. Partisan reconversion is therefore a matter of circumstantial occurring, 
with independence diminishing with each election its desirability.
Despite their dominance of the establishment, political parties seem to 
continuously make efforts to attract independents within their ranks. Several voices, 
especially those who failed to catch a party nomination in the first place and those 
who have encountered resilient partisan pressures during their mandate admit not 
to exclude the possibility to ultimately enter a political party. A.B., former member 
of a political party, elected as independent in June 2008 admits that political parties 
have made him some offers, and ”now after half of mandate has been consumed 
and thinking in perspective, it’s highly probable I will join their ranks again”. L.O. 
on the other hand admitted directly he wishes to join a certain party, especially as 
he feels the need to ”receive protection from unfair attacks”. ”I sell myself for the 
community – I don’t believe this would mean deceiving their belief in me especially 
if this helps us reaching visible results” argued one independent from Cluj. B.E., an 
independent at his first mandate from Covasna, P.V., mayor of an urban locality in 
Maramureş, P.I. from the rural parts of Maramureş, S.E. from Satu Mare and C.B. 
from Cluj say they were approached by several political parties, but they thought that 
none was tempting enough for them to make the move. F.I. admits that indirectly, 
through conditioning local funds, he was influenced by political parties to join them. 
An interesting observation came from one independent originating from Braşov 
county, which assumed independency for the June 2008 elections after reaching the 
conclusion that within the party he formerly belonged to ”he has no future”: I.B. 
feared that independents are forced to jump into the boat of political parties due to the 
lack of resources, and added that ”political parties take advantage of this situation, 
and even they don’t need to invest much resources in that politician”. Then again, 
M.M. said that he was never approached by political parties because they knew he 
would never agree to join their ranks. Similarly, independents such as B.B. and F.C. 
admitted they were never approached by political parties. On the other hand, S.I. 
declared he refused to join political parties as he did not want to offend nobody: 
”The people don’t care about political parties, as long as you do something for them”. 
Thus, maintaining political independence becomes a matter of resisting the conditions 
imposed by political parties, a matter of personal belief, and also directly linked to 
what serves best the immediate electoral interests of the political runner. For that 
reason, comparing the available data with the observations made by independents 
themselves, independence seems to remain highly volatile at the local level. 
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Faced with the decreasing of the scores obtained by independents nationwide, 
an overwhelming part of our interviewed politicians consider that one cause for this 
is represented by the efforts made by political parties to dominate the establishment 
and to integrate more and more political actors. N.G. believes than every political 
party, whether in office or not, wishes to incorporate as many independents as 
possible, and this particular situation leads to the declining of the scores obtained 
by independents. Equally, he considers that, despite the formally assumed 
independence, this category of politicians is highly dependent on those in power to 
receive their funds. Correspondingly, I.B. considers that the most striking aspect of the 
Romanian establishment which affects independence is the allocation of public funds 
discretionary, following a strict partisan command: ”The Governmental measure 
No. 322 distributes the money coming from the European mainly on political terms”. 
C.B. agrees to this, saying that, despite his efforts to obtain highly needed European 
money, he faced numerous obstacles during the first two years of his mandate, 
particularly because of the opposition of political parties. B.E. from a locality in 
Covasna and L.O. from Iaşi County had also problems with the Measure No. 322, as 
their communities were denied the funds. Others see the dropping of independency 
as consequence of the high cost it involves – ”if one wishes to candidate he is highly 
dependent on his own financial power, and nobody wishes to support him in any 
way” (S.I.), ”it’s costly” adds another one (B.E.). A.B. considers that ”the political 
parties have certain advantages hard to compensate – the financial part, their power 
to organize” adding that ”belonging to a political party which is in power you get the 
best chances to finance your projects”. L.Z. thinks that the political parties developed 
a greater capacity in attracting the electorate and that the individual is usually ignored 
because the system is controlled by partisan entities. In the same way, N.C. said that 
one explanation for the decreasing of independents’ scores might the fact that some 
independents which fail to advance their own interests through the mayor’s office 
join political parties or exit politics altogether. Other interpretations were provided 
as well: F.I accuses for the dropping of independents’ scores the fact that mayors are 
badly prepared and depend greatly on the party’s support while lacking any sort 
of political vision. On a similar tone, F.C. believes that politicians hide in the ranks 
of political parties as they lack motivation: ”They [partisan mayors] simply wait for 
governmental programmes and remain under the protective wing of their party”. M.R. 
considers that with a political party a candidate doesn’t need to raise the signatures 
and receives with little effort whatever electoral material he or she needs. M.M. and 
B.B. take the idea even further, saying that our society is highly politicized and also 
that the mayor’s office is not that attractive as it was before because of the struggles, 
vulnerabilities and responsibilities it encompasses. On the other hand, L.S. believes 
that independents in Romania are affected by the mentalities that are active within 
the political system: ”Whenever someone gets into power, everybody else thinks how 
to get rid of him and nobody makes any effort to show support”. Furthermore, he 
considers that the scores obtained by independents are hampered especially of the 
economic situation and of the limited available public funds. Oppositely, B.D. offers us 
a more positive outlook on the matter, considering that, since starting 2008 the funds 
are distributed differently according to a particular fiscal algorithm, independence 
is susceptible to strengthen itself once more, as it should not be necessary anymore 
to depend on the discretionary distribution of funds operated by the parties. Hence, 
in order to better understand why independency occurs with each election more 
and more scarcely we came across several explanations: mostly giving credit to the 
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growing consolidation of the establishment around political parties, to the financial 
practices discriminating against independents, the poor administrative performance 
of independents themselves, the political culture which favours high dependence of 
politicians on organized partisan structures.
Running our interviews we stumbled upon several cases where politicians 
which initially got elected as independents in June 2008, through their secretary or 
other staff, refused to answer our questions. As we considered this occurring rather 
strange, we insisted with our efforts and ended up learning that these politicians were 
recruited by political parties in the meantime. Cross-referencing the data with their 
declarations, we reached several observations on what motivates some independents 
to quit their label in favour of a partisan coating, especially visible for those areas 
where the dominance of one of the main political parties is substantial. For some 
cases it’s about the material benefits and support of a party. Numerous examples arise 
throughout the post-communist decades, with the most recent ones confirming the 
tendency of independents that assume a partisan coating to be mostly captured either 
by the party in power or by that one which controls regional politics. Also, we came 
across cases where independence was assumed only for participating in elections by 
a former party member in order to return to his originating party soon after getting in 
office. This situation is highly recurrent in some parts of Moldavia and Transylvania. 
A particular situation is that of the counties controlled by representatives of the 
Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, where independence occurs either as 
the only viable alternative to the dominant party of the Hungarian minority, either as 
the best chance for Romanians to advance their candidature in those areas intensively 
inhabited by Hungarians. For example, F.I., an independent which managed to win 
a mandate in a Magyar dominated region thinks the high scores of independents in 
that particular region is a consequence of the particular internal atmosphere within 
the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. Similarly, M.R. says that, despite 
the fact that Magyars are united, their electorate is faced with the same faces again 
and again: ”The same actors distributed with different parts”. Moreover, A.B. thinks 
that twenty years after the fall of communism ethnic Hungarians feel a certain tension 
towards the main party representing their interests: ”Little of what was expected was 
achieved and the people became more sceptics towards them”. B.E., an independent 
in Covasna says this path was more about personal choice, adding that he will most 
probably run again, but he remains unsure if he will prolong his independence or 
choose to join a political party. L.Z., an ethnic Magyar elected for the office of mayor 
in the Harghita County, considered that more than ever the issues of the minority 
are less important than administrative ones and the electorate already started acting 
accordingly. S.E. believes that independence is greatly cherished in these areas because 
it has the highest electoral efficiency – both Romanians and ethnic Hungarians can vote 
for independents. On the other hand, M.M., a Romanian mayor in Harghita believes 
the high numbers of independence in that region are produced by a faked form of 
independence, as many running independently represent in fact the interests of the 
Civic Magyar Party, but refuse to assume their partisanship due to the problematic 
situation of this political organisation in the region. 
Often an overlooked phenomenon and treated in the footnotes of political 
science papers, independent candidatures can provide an impressive account at how 
modern politics are directly affected by individual political entities and how the latter 
choose to manifest themselves. And especially because it offers estranged voters 
an open platform to voice their heterogeneous thoughts and expectations, political 
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independence cannot easily be ignored. Even more, the political developments 
visible in Central and Eastern Europe during the last two decades make the scrutiny 
of this phenomenon seem even more imperative. Besides, as current practice shows, 
independence has reached a critical point: fewer candidacies are being advanced, 
even fewer manage to get into office and, generally, the establishment seems to be 
forcing a monopolistic integration of outcasts. Therefore, treating independence at 
the local level in the particular context of post-communist politics is not only a matter 
of academic outlook, but it represents a democratic urgency above all. Our attempt to 
better understand the specific characteristics of non-party actors in Eastern European 
local politics represents only a first step. Nonetheless, in order to achieve a broader 
approach on independent candidatures, future research needs to expand the presented 
framework to a cross-national level in order to assess the motivation and the activity 
of independent politicians throughout the area, and also to further investigate the 
response of the electorate towards the manifestations of local independence.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The present study began as an effort to understand the dynamics developed 
by independent candidatures within the particular setting of post-communist local 
elections. Observing the lack of any similar approach and, moreover, the scarcity 
of examinations on the Eastern European space, our study was intended not only 
at filling a gap in the domain, but also at opening new paths for the study of 
independence within a previously-neglected space. We started our observations from 
acknowledging that, in the case of Romania, the scores obtained by independents 
decrease with each electoral cycle and also that, despite this problematic situation 
of independence in the past two decades, independents continue to advance their 
candidatures. Therefore, our inquiry of the incentives which allow local political 
independence to surface within an unfavourable political situation clearly subject to 
partisanships aimed to better understand what makes independents ignore political 
parties in their search for office and to explore the dynamics related to independence. 
Additionally, we attempted to provide some insight into the often contrasting profiles 
of independents, into the actual obstacles they face, the type of rhetoric they promote, 
their actual path to office and also regarding their political performance thereafter. 
Most importantly, despite the particularities of the subject analysed, this paper tried 
to provide a multidimensional outlook on the matter, severely limiting the heroic 
interpretation of political independence. To address the above mentioned issues 
related to independence we analysed the figures regarding independent candidatures 
advanced at local level in Romania between 1992 and 2008 and we interviewed thirty 
independent politicians which managed to get into office after the latest local polls. 
In applying existing theories on party systems, political independence, local politics 
and voting behaviour to the available data we explicitly assumed that independent 
candidatures and political performance are largely determined by several factors: 
independents’ social standing within the community, their incorporation of issues 
stringent to the circumscription and the political mechanisms and processes that 
legitimate or limit this particular type of candidacies. Namely, independents are 
favoured by the salience of interparty competition, by the liabilities encountered in 
the organizational strength of parties, the characteristics of the electoral provisions, 
by electoral turnout and precedence.
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What about the immediate political profiles of independents? Many enter politics 
as outsiders, with no previous experience in the administration. Others engage 
independently in the electoral race being motivated by issues they feel passionately 
about and that they find corresponding to their professional background. Still, others 
decide to run independently after previously having been members of political parties; 
following the failure to acquire an office as party representatives, controversies with 
other party members, or dissatisfaction with the direction of the party politicians 
might decide to pursue their political career independently. Approaching closely 
the various backgrounds of local political independence, we also acknowledged that 
independence requires solid political determination in order to compensate for the 
absence of partisan support. As noticed, independents have the flexibility to adapt 
their political persona to the different situations which might arise and to adopt a 
variety of issues usually ignored by the representatives of the political parties. Also 
observed during our study was the distinctive recurrence of independence among 
several political backgrounds: the church, the minorities and the local inheritors of 
communist benefits. By far, a particularly interesting occurrence of independence 
was that noticed among Magyar-dominated areas, where it seemed to be driven 
by the wish of political actors for maximum gains, irrespective of their ethnic roots. 
For the most independents’ cases we have dealt with, overcoming their outcast 
situation was realised thanks to previously accumulated professional and social 
resources, which were further employed for gaining political support and raising 
necessary political funds. On the other hand, from our compilation of a general 
typology of independence we observed that local independents hardly differ from 
mainstream candidates representing political parties. If in general elections higher 
status candidates are most favoured, middle-educated candidates do fairly well in 
local elections. Also, similarly to nationwide politics, a bias against younger and 
female candidates is in place for the local level. Hence, rather than being a likely 
emanation of the establishment, the politicians who assume the independent label 
are decisively influenced by circumstantial impetuses, with a similar situation being 
observable on the voters’ side, whose propensity to go for independents seem to be 
less about longstanding enthusiasm. In our analysis we equally saw that it is clearly 
easier for independents to contest local polls than general elections, especially thanks 
to the lack of any substantial barrier to their candidatures. Among the benefits of local 
candidacies we notice there is no need to forfeit a deposit, or to raise vast political 
resources. But, despite these positive outlooks on independence, the scores obtained 
by independents at the past five electoral movements made us question what might 
affect their performance. We ended up identifying several characteristics that confirm 
the manifesting marginalization of independence, among which we consider the 
most important to be the discriminatory allocation of political resources within the 
establishment, low access to highly politicized structures, the maturing of the political 
system, the centrality of partisan structures, and the costs of independence itself.
We began our analysis with some basic numbers in order to assess the performance 
of independents for the selected period. In terms of shares of votes, independents enjoy 
decent scores in the first electoral cycle, with visibly lower numbers of mandates being 
captured with each new electoral cycle, with the most mandates won by independents 
in the case of mayoralties and the local council. Respectively, due to the problems that 
arise in covering large political units, independence has the lower representation in the 
county councils and no participation for the office of president of the county council. 
We have also identified that a geographic preference for independents is in place, with 
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independence being more visible in the central and northern parts of the country. In 
the rural versus urban debate, we can easily observe that local independence mostly 
occurs in small communities. Equally, we saw independence to be little dependent 
on electoral campaigning, with word of mouth representing by far the most import 
electoral activity at the local level. Classical campaigning techniques were also present, 
but their influence decreased the more the candidate was familiar to the electorate. 
Also, we further noted that money seems to be retaining a similarly low importance 
over local independence, with spending being proportionally influenced by the 
magnitude of the circumscription. On the other hand, independents that manage to 
get into office face a similarly difficult task in convincing partisan-controlled councils 
and higher structures of the necessity and usefulness of their projects. Particularly, the 
implementation of their political programmes remains at the discretion of partisan 
bodies, and obtaining an approval or access to public funds require additional efforts 
to be made. Nevertheless, despite this uneasy situation, political independence 
managed to survive all five post-communist electoral cycles. The failure of national 
political parties to respond to the demands of local constituents made room for the 
emergence of various independent outsiders. Independent politicians can be seen as 
providing new channels of engagement and participation. Arguably, independents 
fill the openings left by the major parties in their failure to completely reflect the 
views of the public, and enable individuals which do not have a direct affiliation to 
a political party to engage politically. Nevertheless, political parties are recuperating 
the lost grounds with each election, either as consequence of the more rigid electoral 
provisions favouring partisanships or as result of their numerous attempts at 
integrating independent players into party politics. 
Many states are experiencing a considerable growth of electoral activity outside 
the multi-party system that would make one believe that politics independent of party 
structures will become a more common denominator in future politics. Independents, 
unlike party candidates, are not directly tied to the fate of other candidates and cannot 
draw on party resources to run their electoral campaigns – but this does not mean that 
they will soon represent an equivalent alternative to political parties nor that they will 
wholly emulate partisanships as key organizational forms of modern democracies1. 
This trend is equally valid for Eastern European politics, and especially for the local 
politics of Romania, where we observed that independent politicians depend greatly 
on circumstantial predispositions of the electorate and on the particular arrangements 
of the establishment. In relation to such arguments, independent candidatures are an 
interesting phenomenon. Although it has not resulted in any signicant improvement 
in the number of offices won, the recurrence of independent candidacies during the 
post-communist transition suggests that the party system in Romania is expected to 
continue its internal restructuring and that it has a potential for such independent 
voices in the future. For the time being, Romanian politics leaves little space for 
independent political voices to manifest. Political parties make their best to assure 
their monopole over existing political offices and public finance sources, and their 
structures remain extremely competitive2. However, political independence represents 
a complex occurrence highly susceptible to further contest partisan politics, especially 
at the local level.
1 Éric BÉLANGER, ”Antipartyism...cit.”, pp. 1054-1078.
2 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă…cit., p. 172.
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Keeping in mind its particular pioneering character, we believe that this study 
serves only as a starting point in the investigation of political independence at the 
local level, within the particular confines of the post-communist space. Further debate 
should be ignited regarding the characteristics of that part of the electorate which 
might become prone to support independence, concerning a broader view on political 
independence throughout the rest of the Eastern Europe, and a further emphasis on 
the actual contribution of local independence to the maturing of the post-communist 
system at large. In the same way, it remains to be seen to what extent the suppositions 
advanced within this paper will be matched in practice and, correspondingly, to 
further examine the strength of local independence with the next electoral cycles.
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APPENDIX
Table 1
Mandates Won by Independents at the Local Elections (1992-2008)*
Mayoralties Local Council County Council President of the County 
Council
Mandates % of T 
Mandates
% of T 
Votes
Mandates % of T 
Mandates
Mandates % of T 
Mandates
Mandates % of T 
Mandates
1992 659 22.4 N/A 2684 6.54 N/A 1.36 N/A N/A
1996 251 15.79 16.48 1727 4.33 61 3.55 N/A N/A
2000 159 5.38 7.27 422 1.06 0 0 N/A N/A
2004 82 2.61 2.924 503 1.26 1 0.07 N/A N/A
2008 56 1.75 1.598 358 0.88 1 0.07 0 0
*Source: The Official Gazette of Romania
Figure 1
Evolution of Local Independence between 1992 and 2008
Table 2
Voter Turnout in the Romanian Legislative and Local Elections: 1992-2008
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
Local 65 56.47 50.85 54.23 48.99
Legislative 76.29 76.01 65.31 58.93 39.26
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Table 3
Distribution of Independent Candidatures after the June 2008 Elections
County Urban Rural Candidatures 
(U+R)
Mandates 
won
Available 
mandates
% of 
Mandate
Coeffi cient*
AB 1 2 3 0 78 0 0
AR 0 6 6 2 78 0.025641 0.333333
AG 0 15 15 1 102 0.0098039 0.066667
BC 3 6 9 1 93 0.0107527 0.111111
BH 2 9 11 0 101 0 0
BN 1 4 5 0 62 0 0
BT 0 4 4 1 78 0.0128205 0.25
BV 1 4 5 1 58 0.0172414 0.2
BR 0 1 1 0 44 0 0
BZ 1 1 2 0 87 0 0
CS 3 1 4 1 77 0.012987 0.25
CL 0 4 4 1 55 0.0181818 0.25
CJ 1 12 13 3 81 0.037037 0.230769
CT 1 0 1 0 70 0 0
CV 3 16 19 7 45 0.1555556 0.368421
DB 1 10 11 1 89 0.011236 0.090909
DJ 1 3 4 0 111 0 0
GL 0 1 1 0 64 0 0
GR 0 4 4 0 54 0 0
GJ 0 0 0 0 70 0 0
HG 5 21 26 8 67 0.119403 0.307692
HD 2 5 7 0 69 0 0
IL 1 1 2 0 66 0 0
IS 0 6 6 1 98 0.0102041 0.166667
IF 0 3 3 0 40 0 0
MM 4 7 11 6 76 0.0789474 0.545455
MH 0 0 0 0 66 0 0
MS 2 19 21 3 102 0.0098039 0.125
NT 1 7 8 1 83 0.0120482 0.125
OT 0 5 5 0 112 0 0
PH 0 3 3 0 104 0 0
SM 1 6 7 3 64 0.046875 0.428571
SJ 0 3 3 1 61 0.0163934 0.333333
SB 1 5 6 2 64 0.03125 0.333333
SV 1 12 13 4 114 0.0350877 0.307692
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TR 0 0 0 0 97 0 0
TM 2 12 14 4 98 0.0408163 0.285714
TL 0 4 4 0 51 0 0
VS 0 7 7 2 86 0.0232558 0.285714
VL 0 3 3 1 89 0.011236 0.333333
VR 0 8 8 1 73 0.0136986 0.125
RO 39 240 279 56 3177 0.0176267 0.200717
B 1 0 1 1 6 0.1666667 1
*Coefficient obtained by dividing the number of mandates won by independents to the 
number of mandates available per county.
Figure 2
Independents after the June 2008 Elections
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Map 1
Political Independence across Romania after June 2008 Local Elections
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Map 2
Political Independence across Romania after June 2004 Local Elections
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Map 3
Political Independence across Romania after June 2000 Local Elections
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Map 4
Political Independence across Romania after June 1996 Local Elections
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Table 4
Profiles of the Respondents
No. Name County Type of 
Locality
Number of 
mandates
Former 
partisan 
allegiance
Occupation
1 G.B. Argeş rural 4 no Priest
2 I.B. Braşov rural 1 yes Businessman
5 A.C. Călăraşi rural 5 no Veterinary technician
3 C.B. Cluj rural 1 no Engineer
4 S.I. Cluj rural 4 no Salesperson
6 B.E. Covasna rural 1 no Computer specialist
7 F.I. Covasna rural 1 yes Professor
8 B.D Covasna rural 1 no Civil servant
9 B.T. Covasna rural 1 no Mechanic
10 N.I. Covasna urban 1 yes Businessman
11 M.M. Harghita urban 3 no Jurist
12 L.Z. Harghita rural 2 yes Engineer
13 F.C. Harghita rural 1 yes Economist
14 A.B. Harghita rural 1 yes Engineer
15 B.B. Harghita rural 2 yes Engineer
16 L.O. Iaşi rural 1 no Electrician
17 P.V. Maramureş urban 1 yes Businessman
18 G.N. Maramureş rural 1 no Priest
19 P.I. Maramureş rural 1 yes Engineer
20 L.V. Mureş rural 1 no Social worker
21 M.R. Sălaj rural 1 no Civil servant
22 S.E. Satu Mare rural 2 no Civil servant
23 C.P. Satu Mare rural 1 no Economist
24 S.I. Satu Mare urban 4 no Topography technician
25 B.B. Sibiu rural 1 no Non-governmental
26 L.S. Timiş rural 1 no Mathematician
27 M.A. Timiş rural 3 yes Accountant
28 L.G. Vaslui rural 1 yes Teacher
29 P.R. Vaslui rural 1 no Engineer
